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ABSTRACT

We live in a world where mobile devices are already ubiquitous. It is estimated
that in the United States approximately two thirds of adults own a smartphone,
and that for many, these devices are their primary method of accessing the
Internet [99]. World wide, it is estimated that in May of 2014 there were 6.9
billion mobile cellular subscriptions, almost as much as the world population. Of
these 6.9 billion, approximately 1 billion are smart devices, which are
concentrated in the developed world. In the developing world, users are moving
from feature phones to smart devices as a result of lower prices and marketing
efforts [30]. Because smart mobile devices are ubiquitous, users trust them with
an unprecedented amount of information. This makes security and privacy
primary concerns. Threats such as mobile malware are already substantial, with
over 2500 different types identified in 2010 alone [65]. It is likely that, as the
smart device market continues to grow, so to will concerns about privacy,
security, and malicious software. This is especially true, because these mobile
devices are relatively new. Our research focuses on increasing the security and
privacy of user data on smart mobile devices. We propose three applications in
this domain: (1) a service that provides private, mobile location sharing; (2) a
secure, intuitive proximity networking solution; and (3) a potential attack vector in
mobile devices, which utilizes novel covert channels. We also propose a first
step defense mechanism against these covert channels.
Our first project is the design and implementation of a service, which provides
users with private and secure location sharing. This is useful for a variety of
applications such as online dating, taxi cab services, and social networking. Our
ultrasound modem, enables users to share relatively small pieces of information
with those that are near by, also known as proximity based networking. It has
several advantages over other, existing mechanisms for proximity based
networking. Our third work exposes a novel attack vector utilizing physical
media covert channels on smart devices, in conjunction with privilege escalation
and confused deputy attacks. We show this attack preemptively and also
propose a defense mechnanism to protect user data.
As a contribution to the field, we present these three systems, which together
enrich the smart mobile experience, while providing mobile security and keeping
privacy in mind. Our third approach specifically, presents a unique attack, which
has not been seen ``in the wild'', in an effort to keep ahead of malicious efforts.
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Security and Privacy for Ubiquitous Mobile Devices

Chapter 1

Introduction
Smart mobile devices have exploded in popularity since the introduction of the iPhone
in 2007. We have now come to expect that smart mobile devices are commonplace in
the modern world, and they are quickly growing in the developing world [30]. Users can
choose from a variety of devices, including phones, watches, tablets, bracelets, and other
wearable form factors running several different operating systems including Google's Android, Apple's iOS, and Microsoft's Windows 10 Mobile. Key to the success of mobile
computing is the proliferation of the application (app) market paradigm, which provides
developers and end-users a curated market place for software to run on their mobile devices. However, because the growth of these devices has been so fast, security and
privacy have taken a back seat to convenience, innovation, and ease of use. Developers
have created a wide variety of innovative applications, and because mobile devices are
so practical and useful, users entrust a bounty of sensitive information to them, which is
in jeopardy of being harvested by evildoers. Users trust their mobile devices explicitly
and implicitly with many different types of sensitive information including passwords with
password managers, their financial history through mobile banking, contact information
for their friends and family, their location, web surfing habits, sensitive email, and sms
messages just to name a few. Much research recently has shown that even more, implicit information can be extrapolated from these explicit sources [129, 17, 41, 53, 95, 108].

2

Indeed, it seems that smart devices are so useful and ubiquitous, there is hardly any sensitive information they aren't trusted with!
In this dissertation we present a three layer approach for mobile systems, which improves the security and privacy of sensitive user data in the modern mobile landscape at
the physical layer, the application layer, and the operating system layer. Because mobile
computing is at the center of several important crossroads, including social networking,
privacy, energy efficiency, and ubiquity, these projects span a wide-range of research
topics. Our three projects are: private and secure location sharing, an ultrasonic modem
for proximity networking, and a preemptive demonstration of a novel attack vector utilizing
physical media covert channels on mobile smart devices. In these projects we attempt
to provide solutions to many important research challenges, and improve the overall topography of mobile computing. We feel that we provide a technical ``voice'' to end-users,
whose wants, needs, and concerns are often not well addressed in this area due to their
lack of technical understanding.

1.1

Problems

In order to improve security and privacy in any domain, we must have an adequate definition for both. We define security as the technical mechanisms used to protect data.
For example, encryption is used as a security mechanism to guarantee that only those
with the appropriate keys (information) can access the protected data. Because encryption relies on some computationally intractable problem, we can safely assume that it is
impossible for any attacker, with reasonable resources, to break the system and access
the data. Security mechanisms can be complex, like encryption, which offers a variety of
different tools. But they can also be very simple, such as physically isolating the system
from any network access, or using physical locks to protect the hardware holding sensitive data. Designing systems that use several security mechanisms in conjunction with
one another is non-trivial, and presents itself as a primary research challenge throughout
3

this dissertation.
For security mechanisms to be useful, a sane policy must be crafted. In other words,
there must be a set of rules to enforce, using security mechanisms. For example, a
user may not want a social networking site provider to know their social security number.
Conversely, the government needs to share social security numbers with their assignees,
but not with other, potentially malicious, parties . Policies can be set by users, developers,
service providers, or governments. However, each of these parties is likely to choose a
policy that suits them best, without considering the needs of the others. We have seen this
recently with the revelation of the United States government NSA spying programs [29, 44]
and the San-Bernardino FBI--Apple encryption dispute [52]. Similarly to security, privacy
policies are useless if they cannot be enforced. The two rely on each other fundamentally.
Furthermore, designing policies on behalf of several parties with opposing perspectives
is often intricately complex as different users' wants may conflict.
If a system provides satisfactory policies, and adequate enforcement, we say the system is private and secure. It is possible for a system to be only secure. This would mean
that the fundamental technical mechanisms that protect the data are sound and cannot be
broken by an attacker. However, as mentioned before, having a secure system that does
not enforce sane policies is not useful, and likely is not meaningful. Indeed, many systems today may be considered secure, but not private. The canonical example is social
networking, in which user data is highly secure from third party attackers, except that it is
sold to advertisers. This policy may be considered satisfactory by the social networking
site provider and the advertisers, but not by the end users. The notion of a system that is
private, but not secure is meaningless. Privacy is built on top of security.
It is our hope that we can improve the state of security and privacy in the modern
mobile landscape for end-users specifically, but in a way that is satisfactory by all involved. Unfortunately, systems that are considered private and secure by all are not
easy to design or build. Each party has needs, and the systems must remain convenient
and practical especially for end-users. It is unreasonable to expect users to hand craft
4

elaborate policies, or to have deep technical understanding of the system. Systems that
are secure and private, but even marginally less convenient will likely never be adopted.
To summarize; our research improves the security and privacy of the mobile computing
landscape at the physical layer, the operating system layer, and the application layer. We
build systems that meet these four goals:
• Privacy - A sane set of rules, a policy, should be set forth that describes who has
access to what data and in what context (i.e., time, place, relationship) in order to
protect sensitive data from malicious parties. Policies may be government laws,
rules enforced by the system itself, or may result organically (data that is not stored
on a computer or publicly posted is inherently private).
• Security - Proper technical mechanisms should be used to enforce these policies.
Popular mechanisms include encryption, information verification (such as checksums), and physical locks or barriers. Privacy is built on top of security.
• Convenience - Systems that may be secure and private will usually be passed by
for systems that are convenient for end-users. It is unreasonable to expect users to
craft elaborate policies, or to police the system manually. It is not unreasonable for
users to expect a secure and private version of any existing service, with little or no
sacrifices in convenience.
• Mobility - Our research focuses on mobile platforms. Mobile devices are already
ubiquitous, with smart mobile devices continuing to gain ground, and they carry a
plethora of sensitive information. It is clear that mobile is present and likely the
future of personal computing for years to come.
In the current environment, end users maintain the vast majority of sensitive and valuable
information. Additionally, they are not resilient against attacks, which can harm them
personally. Governments and corporations on the other hand, are organizations that, by
design, limit the liability of those personally involved. While we expect that all parties
5

will act somewhat selfishly, putting their own best interests forward, our system focuses
on providing systems that aid end-users most, which are currently at a disadvantage
because they have little influence on the design of the systems they use, and lack technical
knowledge to make properly informed decisions.
A good example of this disadvantage is the permission system used in the Android
operating system. Users can install third party applications and, at install time, the user
is presented with a list of special permissions the application requires to run. These permissions allow the application to access sensitive information sources such as the user's
contact list, or hardware sensors. The user can choose to accept these permission requests, and use the application, or not. The user has little influence on the design of the
system, and the granularity of their decision is far to coarse. Furthermore, it has become
apparent that users seldom read or understand these permission system prompts.

1.2

Contributions

In this proposal we make three primary contributions, each of which makes several technical and research contributions in their own right. We present (1) a service for location
sharing with location based access control to improve the application layer, (2) an ultrasound modem on common smart mobile devices for proximity networking at the physical
layer, and (3) we preemptively expose a potential attack based on physical media covert
channels. We also provide a defense mechanism at the operating system level. In the
remainder of this section we elaborate on each of these three contributions.
Private Location Sharing - Ubiquitous mobile devices, along with extremely popular
social media applications have spurred a recent surge in location based services, which
leverage the precise locale of the user. Some examples of these applications include
proximity based dating, cab hailing services, finding directions, and neighbor discovery
based social networking. We focus on providing a specific, location based back-end service, while maintaining rigorous privacy and security. Specifically, we propose two dif6

ferent protocols for private proximity testing, which allow two users to determine if they
are physically near one another, without revealing their actual, precise location to each
other or any third party. Our protocols have two important features that are key to our
contribution. Namely, they are purely distributed, only relying on third parties for blind
message passing. We also are the only work, to the best of our knowledge, to allow
the user fine grained control over what they consider to be ``physically near''. In private
proximity detection, one user, Alice, wishes to learn if she is near a second user (Bob).
Bob enforces a distance requirement Pb ; Alice must be within Pb meters of him to be considered near him. Bob can alter his policy, Pb , arbitrarily between 10m and 160km, and
he can specify different polices for different users or at different times of the day. In implementing our system we overcome several challenges including circumventing network
address translation (NAT) to perform name resolution, fast and private proximity detection, and practicality concerns such as query rate. We implement both protocols in two
different location based applications to demonstrate their usability. Both of our protocols
are able to determine proximity in under 50 seconds for policies less than 160 kilometers
with ten meter granularity. We believe that private and secure variations of mobile and
social networking services are important for the future of mobile computing and can be
supported by our private proximity detection protocols.
Ultrasound based Proximity Networking - Our second work proposes the use of ultrasound as a physical medium for proximity based networking on mobile devices. Proximity based networking is growing in popularity with mobile devices. It is obvious and
intuitive to users that they should be able to share small pieces of information between
their mobile devices when they are co-located. Examples include sharing URL links with
an office mate, mobile payments at retail establishments, and sharing encryption keys to
bootstrap private communication on a second channel. Proximity based networking also
provides some primitive security, in that users must be physically co-located to exchange
information. While there are several existing technologies for proximity based networking, including near field communication (NFC), bluetooth (BT), and WiFi Direct, none of
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them offer the same security and convenience as ultrasound. For example, ultrasound
has an easy to configure range limitation, based on the device's existing volume controls. Additionally, it does not require any special hardware, because all mobile devices
already carry speakers and microphones that support ultrasound. Our system faces several challenges including encoding and decoding information in a way that does create
audible artifacts such as beating, and very precise synchronization to accurately recover
phase information. By implementing this system, we provide a valuable and convenient
mechanism for proximity based networking between virtually all mobile smart devices.
Physical Media Covert Channels - In an effort to protect the sensitive information
that is stored on users' devices, we present a preemptive demonstration of a novel attack
vector. Our attack utilizes a new type of covert channel based on physical media. For
example, using the vibration motor as a sender and the accelerometer as a receiver. The
attack runs as follows; an attacker first learns some sensitive information about a victim
by running some code on that victim's smart device. Traditionally it is much more difficult
to move this information off of the device, than it is to access it in the first place. The
attacker encodes this sensitive information in vibration motor timings, and then recovers
the data using the accelerometer, running in another application, to detect and decode
the vibrations. The attacker can then send the information out over the Internet. This
attack is dangerous because the second application can gain access to any information
that is available to the first application, regardless of it's own permission allocations. We
propose several novel covert channels, which are plentiful on smart devices due to their
wide range of sensors and physical world hardware devices. By utilizing these covert
channels, our attack circumvents the state of the art taint-tracking defense schemes to
enable privilege escalation attacks and information leakage. We also improve the mobile
operating system by proposing a defense mechanism against this attack. It is our hope
that by proposing these new covert channels, and giving a first step defense, that more
robust and secure defense mechanisms can be designed.
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Chapter 2

Related Work
2.1

Location Privacy

Several papers propose methods for making location information private that can be applied to any location based service [87, 66, 13, 31]. These papers obfuscate location and
temporal information, usually based on the k-anonymous measure. Although all of these
systems intend for location based services to still function effectively, they all gradually
erode service quality. As the user's location becomes more and more vague, location
based services become less and less useful. For example, if a user's location data has
been obfuscated to the granularity of 400m, a cab hailing service becomes useless. There
is even literature that offers a framework for choosing the best location privacy system for
the task at hand, [97, 96]. However, even after choosing the best system for preserving
privacy, the location based service may not function correctly or adequately. The idea of
a one-size-fits-all solution to location privacy is, at the least, controversial, as the idea of
obfuscation has been shown to have security drawbacks [104, 51].
Obfuscation, even k-anonymous obfuscation, does not provide adequate privacy when
applied to location information, because attackers can still perform trajectory attacks. Furthermore, k-anonymity does not protect users when they are in a densely populated area.
While it is true the attacker cannot distinguish the user from the many other users near
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her, the attacker is actually given higher accuracy results, because many users are more
likely to be near one another, and the location information needs to only be slightly obfuscated to be indistinguishable from other users. The result is that the attacker can learn
your location with only a few meters of inaccuracy.
In order to achieve location privacy while still maintaining the proper operation of location based services, we must take each service on a case by case basis. Privacy and
security must be built into the design. This is the goal of [113], [78], and [8]. Each of these
papers attempt to design one specific location-based service in a privacy preserving way.
Mobishare, [113], allows users to share their (authenticated) location values with one another, without allowing any third parties to link user (OSN profile) with location. However,
it requires significant changes to the infrastructure including cellular towers. Our protocol
avoids any changes to the network infrastructure.
There are several papers that focus on a service similar to ours [125, 109, 54, 98, 68,
79, 82, 46]. All of these papers offer the theory behind private proximity testing. Our first
private proximity detection protocol closely relies on Nergiz's et. al., work [69] but makes
a critical improvement, which allows our protocol to run in a much lower time. The main
contribution of our work is a pragmatic, configurable, and performant implementation of
the theory involved in these works. We provide a thorough evaluation, including end-toend measurements to ascertain the system speed. The technical challenges here are
the numerous engineering problems and security concerns. Additionally, we show an
extension of our system that allows users to be alerted as soon as their friends are nearby
efficiently. We also provide a second private proximity detection protocol, similar to [83],
that is based on oblivious transfer, using bloom filter data structures.
Other approaches for private proximity detection are also being explored such as the
use of ambient sensor data (such as radio dynamics [120], or background audio [106]) to
act as a shared, location dependent secret. The drawback of these systems is that users
cannot define what they consider to be ``nearby'' with fine granularity, as they can in our
system using Pb . Other encryption systems, such as order preserving encryption, may
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also be used to build a system similar to the one described in this work [77, 5, 35]. We
leave this avenue open as possible future work.

2.2

Proximity and Audio Networking

Our second contribution is an ultrasound modem for proximity networking. Audio communication has been proposed in the past, but these legacy systems are almost always
either audible [26, 59, 60] or designed for use underwater [6, 102, 103, 118]. Although,
one work, [59] does have a section on ultrasound transmission, they work with laptop
hardware, and achieve only 8bps. There has also been a recent proliferation in attempts
to replace NFC by commercial projects [23, 24, 80, 90, 100]. Unfortunately, none of these
projects published technical details, so we cannot compare them to our system with much
granularity. However, two of them advertise concrete bit rates; Zoosh by Narette advertises 300bps [80], and SSCConnect advertises 2.2kbps [90], both of which are much
slower than our system.
Audio is an attractive choice as a networking medium in water, [6, 102, 103, 118],
because its propagation is much better than traditional RF energy. These underwater
audio modems are fundamentally different from our scheme because they don't have
the additional constraints of remaining inaudible for humans, or the limited sample rates
available on typical smart mobile devices . The hardware for under water transmission is
usually custom built.
Some systems which try to use other media for proximity based networking have been
been propose in recent literature [94]. A system called ``Cobra'' was proposed by Hao
et al., [34], which makes use of devices' LCD screens and cameras to transmit data at
roughly 100kbps. Their system produces 2D, five color bar-codes, which are displayed
on the screen of the sender and decoded by the camera of the receiver. Another system called ``Pulse'' [42] uses the magnetometer for one-way communication, achieving
roughly 44 bits per second. What we propose in our work may have similar application
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design challenges, but is fundamentally different in that we make use of high frequency
sound as our transmission medium.
In addition to [59], there are three relevant academic works in which ultrasonic audio in
air is used. Hanspach and Goetz [33] re-purpose two existing audio modems by changing
the carrier frequency to 18.6kHz. They incorporate these modems in malware designed
to bridge traditional ``air-gap'' systems. They can achieve at best 20bps at a range of
19.7 meters using two Lenovo brand laptops. Matsuoka et. al. [62] apply a similar OFDM
based modulation scheme to our own, but are only able to achieve approximately 1kbps.
And, a previous Ubicomp paper, AirLink [12], uses ultrasound for data transmission and
also measures Doppler shift to identify the intended receiver. In contrast to these works,
our system is specific to common smart mobile devices, and it easily outperforms all in
speed, achieving greater than 4kbps on a variety of smartphones and scenarios.
In the recent past, work in audio based networking was focused on making the audio tones audible but melodic and more pleasant for the user [59, 60]. However, even
melodic tones are not desirable in all situations. They are also subject to background
noise, which is typically more prevalent for audio in the audible spectrum. Previous work,
``Dhwani'' [88], emits some noise in all of their modulation implementations (OFDM BASK,
QPSK, and 8-PSK) because they operate on 1kHz of spectrum centered on 6.5kHz, and
because they do not make any effort to work around the noises emitted as a result of modulation. Their system achieves data rates of 2.4kbps with 80% packet success, 1.6kbps
with 95% packet success, and 800bps with 100% packet success using 8-PSK, QPSK,
and BPSK respectively. Because our system uses ultrasonic audio, it is completely silent
and faces a substantially greater technical challenge in modulating without making any
human audible sounds.
There has also been some recent literature on protocols that enable secure, authenticated proximity networking. EnCore [4], Smokescreen [14], BlueID [38], and SDDR
(secure device discovery and recognition) [50] are all protocols for neighbor discovery,
which rely on existing network mediums; Bluetooth, WiFi (ad-hoc / Direct), or NFC. Our
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contribution is to provide a new networking medium that these works can be layered on
top of. It may even be possible to create new protocols designed to leverage the unique
characteristics of the underlying medium. For example, using a long range medium to find
candidates and their distances [124, 127], and then using our ultrasound modem with the
proper sending power to transmit encryption keys only to the nearest n candidates.

2.3

Information Leakage on Smart Devices

In our final work, we improve mobile operating systems by exposing information leakage
through physical media covert channel attacks, and then designing and implementing a
defense scheme to protect sensitive user data against them. Covert channels have a rich
academic history [55, 63]. Butler Lampson first described ``the confinement problem''
[47], in which one entity (the client) must trust another (the server) with some data to
perform some calculation. Ideally, the server would be confined, and unable to transmit
or store the data. Mr. Lampson, however, was unable to envision all the possible ways
that the service may transmit this data. To put our work in the context of the confinement
problem, our work adds new channels by which a confined server can transmit data to
itself, or to another process.
Covert channels on smartphones have been studied previously [11, 92], but to the best
of the author's knowledge, we are the first to propose covert channels that use physical
media, rather than internal / virtual media such as processor workload, cache manipulation, system wide settings, or file sizes.
There are several works [61, 92, 108, 111] that attempt to steal some data from the
user, utilizing a variety of different internal / virtual covert channels to perform privilege
escalation, and circumvent taint-tracking analysis, similar to our work. Our contribution is
unique in that it is the first to use physical media covert channels. These channels are
particularly dangerous, because they are much more difficult to identify as malicious.
Our defense scheme is an extension of the state of the art defense schemes, aimed at
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tracking sensitive information as it flows across a physical media covert channel. Works
on defense mechanisms for the attacks similar to what we propose in Chapter 5 can be
broken into three categories. In the first, researchers propose that we replace sensitive
data with ``mock'' data when feeding it to untrusted applications [7, 37]. These systems
do protect user information, but they erode the quality of benign applications and are
intrusive to users, who must make either a few broad decisions or many small decisions
to protect their data. This goes against our goal of ensuring the user does not have to
make elaborate or complex policy choices to protect their data.
The second category of defense is taint tracking analysis, [9, 22, 28, 45]. In these
systems, sensitive information APIs are marked as ``sources.'' Variables that store this
information (e.g., microphone data, user contacts) are marked as ``tainted.'' The tainted
data are followed through the execution of the program, tainting other data that they effect
explicitly (direct assignment). If tainted information reaches a sensitive sink (e.g., Internet
Socket, IPC, etc.), the flow is stopped and/or the user is notified.
Machine learning is proposed in [89] to identify sources and sinks during run-time.
Their system, ``SuSi'', relies on supervised learning, which means a list of known (manually tagged as malicious or benign) Android APIs are used to train a classifier. The system
classifies based on features such as method name (i.e., ``get...'', ``put...''), and method
call return type. These taint-tracking systems cannot be naively adapted for use to defend
against our covert channels, because we cannot treat every invocation of a sensor API
with sensitive information, to be malicious. An application may use a device benignly at
one time, and maliciously at another time. For example, an incoming SMS will almost
certainly activate the speaker or vibration motor or both benignly to notify the user.
The third defense mechanism category is alternate permission systems, [25, 56, 93,
112, 119]. These systems are not a good solution to the attack proposed in our work,
because any user interaction with sensitive sources is interrupted with some GUI prompt.
Because so many covert channels can be built, and sensitive information is commonly
accessed on these devices, these prompts would arise far too frequently. Many systems
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propose more fine-grained permissions, [10, 75, 121]. These systems rely on the user
to construct policies, which will stop malicious use cases, but allow benign ones. This,
again, goes against our design philosophy of convenience for the end-user.
Our defense scheme is similar to the recent work ``ASM'' [36]. Both systems hook into
key system events, and then allow application developers or security researchers to define
specific actions that can be taken on these events. We are not able to leverage this work
directly in our implementation because the current ASM implementation does not include
the devices we focus on in our work such as the sensors, speaker and microphone, or the
vibration motor. Our contribution, which ASM encourages, is the specifics of the treatment
once these events occur.
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Chapter 3

Location Sharing with Trust and
Proximity Based Access Control
Users commonly need a mechanism to determine if they are near one another to support
many of today's popular mobile applications. In this chapter two protocols are presented,
which provide this functionality in a private and secure way. We aim to show that private
variants of these applications are possible, thereby improving the security and privacy for
users at the application level.

3.1

Background

Smart mobile devices are now ubiquitous in the developed world. It has been estimated
recently that there are 2.6 billion such devices worldwide, and that the market is becoming
saturated in the U.S. and Europe [58]. Modern smart mobile devices are able to assess
their own location via a variety of techniques including built-in GPS radios, WiFi based
location mapping, and cellular tower triangulation. Because of this, more and more location based services and applications are being offered to, and used by, consumers.
Service providers can offer useful location based services such as cab hailing, directions, nearby friend alerts, fair rendezvous points between friends [8], and simple location
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sharing. Some popular OSNs, such as yik-yak [3] and tinder [2] are centered on the concept of enforcing distance based access control. However, location information is highly
sensitive, and it must be protected and safe-guarded from potentially malicious parties.
Providing these services in such a way that protects user location data, while at the same
time remaining practical from a usability point of view is the core contribution of this work.
Specifically, we aim to provide private proximity detection (PPD, sometimes called private proximity testing: PPT) in a pragmatic and highly usable way. In private proximity
detection two users wish to determine if they are near one another, without revealing their
actual locations to each other or to any third party.
Location information privacy is nuanced and location information is highly valuable
to attackers for two reasons. First, using this information, adversaries can perform a
variety of dangerous attacks, which range from mild inconveniences, such as dropping
by for lunch unexpectedly, to targeted advertisements, and a variety of much more serious
attacks. An adversary can use location information to more easily steal a user's identity,
determine the answer to common security questions, and even stalk the user. The very
nature of location information introduces the threat of physical harm. It can even be used
by governments to enforce strict, totalitarian-style laws. Secondly, it can easily be used to
derive other information about a person. For example, it is trivial, given a location trace,
to determine the home address of a target victim (the address they are at most frequently
between 12:00am and 7:00am), or their place of work (similarly) [1]. Inferring information
from a location trace can also reveal other, sensitive information when more sophisticated
analysis is employed [15], [85].
Currently, it is common for many location based service providers to require the user
to upload their location information directly to the service provider. This information is then
used to perform some computation, which is vital to their service, and offer some benefit
back to the user(s). This means, however, that service providers have unfettered access
to their users' location data. Unfortunately, services providers are weakly motivated to
protect this information from the world at large, as has been demonstrated in part by the
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NSA privacy revelations [29] and the widespread use of targeted advertising.
Clearly, providing location based services, such as those mentioned previously, in a
private and practical way is profoundly important. However, doing so is not trivial. By
providing a mechanism for private proximity detection, we enable these services to use
our service, and provide the same functionality, without requiring users to expose their
location information to anyone including other users, the service provider, and any third
parties such as advertisers, Internet service providers, or malicious attackers.
Unfortunately, providing private proximity detection for location based, mobile applications and services is not trivial. The most naive approach to providing location based
services in a secure and private way is simply encrypting user location data before transmitting it to the service provider. Unfortunately, this does little to protect the user, since
the service provider is not necessarily trusted. Additionally, users have very high expectations about the running time and configuration of services and applications they use in
general. These standards are especially difficult to meet for developers on smart mobile
devices, which typically have limited computational resources such as CPU and RAM.
Furthermore, users will have naturally different definitions of ``nearby'' in proximity detection, which depend on a variety of factors including the exact purpose of the application,
the privacy desires of the user, and the other party with whom their proximity is being
tested. These factors complicate the task of providing private proximity detection. Providing PPD in a naive way, results in a system that is too rigid, not robustly private, and
most importantly, is not able to run fast enough on consumer grade smart mobile devices.
Compared with previous work, we are the first, to the author's knowledge to investigate
this problem in a specific application scenario. While there is work on private set intersection, and proximity detection in general, we investigate the research issues that arise
was attempting to provide these services to users in a pragmatic way. Specifically, we
overcome limited CPU and memory resources, we provide reasonable message passing
and reference finding systems, and we allow for a configurable system, which allows the
users to specify, online, what they consider to be ``close'' or ``nearby.''
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Our system, nearpri, aims to offer location proximity detection in a convenient, privacy
preserving, and secure way. Specifically, we build a system which allows a user, (Alice),
query another user in her social network, (Bob), to see if they are near one another. Our
system, without exposing location information to either party, or the OSN provider, allows
Bob to test if Alice is within a certain distance of him (private proximity detection). We
refer to this distance as Bob's policy Pb . If Alice and Bob are not within Pb meters of one
another, both parties learn only this fact. If they are within Pb , then Bob learns this, and he
can optionally share this information with Alice or the service provider. Our system allows
for every user to maintain their own policy. By requiring that users are near Bob, we
provide a secure variant of what is the core of many popular mobile services today. We
protect Bob's location information from his friends (or malicious peer users), the service
provider(s), and any other, possibly malicious, third parties. Alice, although participating
in the private proximity detection protocol, does not reveal her precise location. Only Bob
learns anything about her, and he only learns whether or not she is less than Pb meters
from him.
In this work we provide two distinct private set intersection protocols, each used to
support proximity detection. Our protocols are flexible, in that each user is able to maintain
their own policy. Users can change their policies online, and can even assign different
policies for different queriers, or at different times. Our protocols are also fast in the
face of limited computational resources, common to smart mobile devices. We make the
following key contributions:
• We present the design of two private proximity detection protocols, which allow one
party to determine, privately and securely, if a second party is within a certain predetermined, user-configurable distance. Our first protocol is based on homomorphic
encryption, and the second is based on oblivious transfer.

• We give two application examples, each making use of private proximity detection,
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to show the viability of enhancing the security and privacy of user locations in location based applications such as yik-yak [3], and tinder [2]. Our applications demonstrate the practicality of our implementations and are described in Section 3.5.

• We present a novel and elegant method of discretizing GPS coordinates for use
in our system. We utilize a binary tree data structure, with a novel construction
method, which allows us to support policy granularity as small as 10m.

• We build and evaluate a working implementation of both protocols. We put in great
effort to make our systems practical and usable. Our evaluation shows that our
protocols are fast, do not require modification of any infrastructure, and do not leak
information to any third parties.

3.2

Problem Description

Private proximity systems allow one user, Alice, to query another user, Bob. For our
specific implementation, it must be determined if Alice is within a certain range of Bob,
called Bob's policy, Pb . Every user in the system defines their own policy, which may be
changed at any time, but must remain static while the protocol is running. Determining if
Alice is within Pb , without revealing the location of either user to the other, is our definition
of private proximity detection. Below we define the problem in greater detail.
At all times, every user has a current location; a 2-tuple of that user's geodetic GPS
coordinates < lat, lon >. Where lat ∈ R in the range [−90, 90], and lon ∈ R in the range
[−180, 180]. Each user also maintains their policy, Pb , which is a factor of ten meters
in the range [30m, 20000km], (20000km ≈

1
2

the Earth's circumference). The goal is to

determine if Alice's location is in the circle centered at Bob's location, with radius Pb .
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To facilitate this, we divide the earth into a grid based on the longitude, latitude coordinate systems as shown in Fig. 3.1. Specifically, we descritize the grid with a granularity
of 10m. Bob's location and policy define a spherical ``cap'' (circular area on a sphere),
which is then approximated using grid squares. Because the squares only approximate
the spherical cap, they introduce some error. Thankfully, this error is negligible and grows
smaller as the policy grows larger. This is because a larger policy requires more squares
to represent, and like pixels on a computer screen, the squares approximate the circular
shape better.

Latitude

Longitude

B

Figure 3.1: Geodetic grid and spherical cap. A small error is introduced due to the difference
between the theoretical circle, centered at Bob, and the squares used as an approximation.

3.2.1 Assumptions
We assume that Alice and Bob are curious but not malicious. They will follow the protocol correctly, but once the protocol has ended they can perform any computation they
want on the information (encrypted or otherwise) acquired. In related work this is usually referred to as ``semi-malicious'' or ``honest but curious.'' We do assume that users
cannot forge their GPS coordinates, which obviates the possibility of many attacks such
as [122]. While it is possible for users to forge their location using applications or the Android developer tools, it is detectable. Either the user has modified the developer option
``Allow Mock Locations'', or the user has root access on the device [18], which is technically challenging for typical consumers, and very difficult to be made undetectable even
for experts. Although we did not implement these checks in our application, adding them
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would be trivial.

3.3

System Design

In this work we present the design and implementation of two proximity detection protocols. Both designs are fully distributed, as depicted in Fig. 3.2. All computation is done
on the users' mobile devices. However, the clients do connect to a third party, centralized
server for message passing. (Facebook Chat in the first system and a custom message
passing server in the second). By doing this, we do not have to do name/address resolution of clients directly, we easily circumvent NAT and firewalls, which block incoming
connections, and for the case of Facebook, messages are stored when users are not
online, allowing users to be temporarily ``unavailable.'' Despite the fact that our system
sends messages over the Internet, and/or directly through the Facebook, user location
information is never leaked.

Internet
Facebook

Figure 3.2: Physical Setup. Phones communicate by sending messages, over the Internet, in the
Facebook chat API to one another.

3.3.1 Homomorphic Cryptography
Homomorphic encryption takes a foundational role first PPD protocol. We use Paillier
encryption, in which the following equations hold true.
D[(E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ))%n2 ] = (m1 + m2 )%n

(3.1)

D[(E(m1 )m2 )%n2 ] = (m1 ∗ m2 )%n

(3.2)
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D[(E(m2 )m1 )%n2 ] = (m1 ∗ m2 )%n

(3.3)

Here E() denotes Paillier encryption, D[] is Paillier decryption, n is the product of two
large primes, p and q, and mi is the plain text message encoded as an integer. The
implications of equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) are very useful. Computation can be done
with encrypted values that translates to operations in the plain text domain. This allows
parties to do blind computation on encrypted values. For more information on Paillier
encryption, including key generation, please refer to [114].

3.3.2

Main Idea

In order to better understand the first protocol, we first introduce a simple example. Alice
wants to determine if she is within Pb of Bob. Bob is willing to participate in the test, but
only if it is guaranteed that he will not reveal his location. In order to achieve this, we
begin with two sets of location values α and β, which correspond to latitude and longitude
respectively.
As a user moves North or South across the surface of the Earth, we can think of
their location in terms of latitude values. However, we have discretized these values into
10m wide ``regions'' or ``bands'' which we number uniquely. These numbers comprise
the set β. Similarly, when moving West or East the user moves across discrete longitude
bands, which are uniquely numbered to form the set α. This is easily visualized in Fig. 3.3.
Because the latitude line selected has an impact on the distance between longitude lines
(more at the equator, less near the poles), the number of elements in this set (discrete
locations) varies. However for both α and β, every location represents at most 10m of
area. By overlaying these two, we arrive at the grid show in Fig. 3.1.
In order to determine if Alice is near Bob, Bob builds two subsets, one from α and the
other from β. Bob's subsets contain the location values (ID numbers) of all the locations
(bands / grid squares) in the range [Lb −Pb , Lb +Pb ] where Lb is Bob's location (longitude or
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Figure 3.3: Latitude and Longitude bands. Note: in our implementation the bands are closer
together than as shown (10m distance at the most).

latitude). Alice builds two singleton sets, each containing the location value corresponding
to her latitude or longitude regions respectively.
If Alice's latitude and longitude singleton sets intersect with Bob's corresponding sets,
we know that Alice must be within Bob's policy, Pb . Determining if one of Alice's singleton
sets intersects with Bob's set is trivial if Alice and Bob can share their values with one
another. However, our goal is to hide their locations. In order to do this, Bob generates
two sets of several, degree one, polynomials. One set of polynomials are rooted at his
longitude set values, and the other; his latitude set values. Specifically, each polynomial
is rooted at one values in the range [Lb − Pb , Lb + Pb ]. This can be seen in Eq. (3.4) where
each Ci is equal to a corresponding band / region ID number.
(X − C1 ),

(X − C2 ),

...

(X − Cn )

(3.4)

Bob sends the encryption of the negated coefficients (E(−Ci ) ∀i ∈ [1, n]) from these
polynomials to Alice. Referring to Eq. (3.1) we can see that Alice can evaluate the polynomials at her singleton set element's value, La , even though she only has the coefficients
in cipher-text by using homomorphic encryption.
D[(E(La ) ∗ E(−Ci ))%n2 ] = (La − Ci )%n
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(3.5)

Therefore, Alice computes E(La ) ∗ E(−Ci )%n2 , and sends back the resulting value
to be decrypted by Bob. If the decrypted result is 0, Bob knows that Alice's value La = Ci
indicating that Alice's set intersects with Bob and that Alice is near Bob. This process is
repeated once for longitude and then again for latitude.

3.3.3 An Improvement
If Bob uses every node in the range [Lb − Pb , Lb + Pb ], the protocol will not scale well as
Bob's policy increases, because Bob will generate potentially thousands of polynomials.
This is demonstrated in our evaluation in Section 3.8. To solve this problem, we use a
binary tree to reduce the size of Bob's set, which is inspired by authors A.E. Nergiz et.
al., [69]. For the following we perform everything identically twice, once for longitude and
again for latitude. We begin by taking the set of longitude (latitude) location values, β (α),
and use these as the leaf nodes in a binary tree.
The leaves are uniquely numbered, from N, using the ID numbers of the set elements
(the band/region numbers). The values used for the tree nodes above the leaf level are
chosen carefully so that every node in the entire tree is numbered uniquely. For a given,
non-leaf node, value = lef tChild + 4003017. If the node does not have a left child, then
value = rightChild+(4003017−2h−1 ) where h is the current height in the tree. 4,003,017
is used because that is the largest longitude leaf node value. 4,003,003 is used in the
latitude tree. This guarantees that any node at level h will be greater than any node at
level h − 1 and that all nodes will be uniquely numbered. When building the parent of a
particular node, we must know the orientation of the branch connecting these two nodes.
Due to the careful choice of the node values above the leaf level, the correct branch
directions are encoded in the binary representation of the leaf nodes' values (0 is used
to represent a rightward branch, and 1 represents a leftward branch). This allows us to
build only a segment of the tree, efficiently, from the leaf level up.
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14863547
10860530

6857513

6857515
A

2854497

10860534

6857517

B

2854498

2854500

2854501

2854499
Lon: 76.71126

Figure 3.4: Example tree segment (longitude only). The tree was generated by Bob at 37.2710,
76.71126, and Pb = 10 meters. Bob's wall set = {2854497, 6857515, 6857517}. Alice's path set
= {2854499, 6857515, 10860530, 14863547, ...}. Node 6857515 can be generated from the left
child or the right child. 6857515 = 2854498 + 4003017 = 2854499 + (4003017 − 21−1 ). The leaf node
at longitude 76.71126 generates 2854499 ≈ 76.71126+180
0.0000899321 .

3.3.4 Utilizing The Binary Tree
Alice and Bob each construct two binary trees in this way, one for their longitude and
another for their latitude values. Bob uses a subset of nodes from this tree to use as roots
for constructing his polynomials. We refer to Bob's subset as the wall set. The span of a
node is the set of leaf nodes which can be reached as children of that node, (i.e., can be
reached by following depth first search from that node). Bob's wall set is the set of nodes,
highest in the tree, with spans that collectively cover all of, and only, the elements in Bob's
range, [Lb − Pb , Lb + Pb ]. Bob uses the values from the wall set to build his polynomials. It
might seem obvious that the root node alone would be an adequate (singleton) wall set.
However, the root node often spans a larger range of leaves than Pb allows. In Fig. 3.4,
Bob's wall set = {2854497, 6857515, 6857517}.
We refer to Alice's subset as the path set. The path set is simply the set of nodes
connecting her location, (leaf node) to the root node. In Fig. 3.4 Alice is located at node
2854498 so her path set = {2854498, 6857515, 10860530, 14863547, ...}. Alice's path
set actually extends further than is depicted in Fig. 3.4 but these nodes are omitted for
brevity.
The intuition behind these two sets is that Bob's set forms a wall, (the dashed line in
Fig. 3.4). Alice's path set will necessarily break through this wall if Alice is within Pb of
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Bob. In Fig. 3.4 Alice's and Bob's sets intersect at node 6857515. The value at which the
two sets intersect is an element of Bob's wall set and therefore, a root of one of Bob's
polynomials.

3.3.5 Putting It All Together
Prior to the protocol running, Alice constructs her latitude and longitude trees and derives
her path set node values for each. Then, when she wants to query Bob, she sends a
simple message initiating the protocol. Bob constructs his trees and corresponding wall
sets. Then, Bob encrypts the negated coefficients of the polynomials (rooted at his wall
set values) and sends the encrypted coefficients, along the public key he used, back
to Alice. Alice, uses the encrypted coefficients to re-create the polynomials, and uses
homomorphic encryption, along with Bob's public key, to encrypt her path-set values, and
evaluate the polynomials using them. Bob also includes information about the height in
the tree of each coefficient. The height information is useful to Alice because without it,
she does not know which of her values to use as input to the various polynomials and
the method proposed in [69], is too slow. In the worst case, she must evaluate every
polynomial at every one of her location values, approximately O(n2 ) work. Using the
height information, she can reduce the search space, because she now knows which
of her values correspond to which polynomials. So, she uses the height information to
evaluate each polynomial only once, using her path set node at the corresponding height.
Alice sends the polynomial evaluations, (encrypted), back to Bob, who can decrypt them.
Bob decrypts these values and, if any value decrypts to zero, Bob knows that his wall
set and Alice's path set intersect at this point, and that she is within his policy. This is
repeated once for longitude and again for latitude.
When the policy testing is completed, Bob sends a message back to Alice indicated
that they have passed the proximity test. Optionally, a third party service can also be
notified, in order to provide some functionality such as hailing a cab for both users.
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3.4

Alternate Approach

In our evaluation in Section 3.8 we show that our system is able to process queries in the
order of tens of seconds. This is because of the expensive multiplication and exponentiation of large cipher text values as well as the limited transmission rate of the Facebook
message passing system. Due to the limitations of this approach, we also present a second PPD protocol designed to achieve the same goal. This second protocol is a key
contribution different from our previous work [71].. In this section, we detail the second
private proximity detection protocol, which utilizes bloom filter data structures and oblivious transfer to process queries more quickly in order to be more practical for end users.
First, we provide some background on these two tools.

3.4.1

Bloom Filter and Oblivious Transfer Background
BFa
path set: {2, 6, 9, 11}

0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Figure 3.5: Example bloom filter. The map set of element 6 = {5, 7}.

A bloom filter (BF) is a relatively simple data structure, which is used to identify the
elements of a set. BFs are very efficient for inserting elements, and verifying if an element
is a member of the set, but there are also a few drawbacks. A BF is represented by an
array of m bit values, all of which are initialized to zero. In order to insert an element,
that element is hashed by k different hash methods. The output of each hash method
(modulus m) points to an index in the array, which is then changed from 0 to 1 (values
that are already 1 remain unchanged). The collection of all the index values for a particular
element we call the ``map set'' of that element. In order to test if an element is a member of
the set, that element is fed into the k hash functions to get the map set, similar to insertion.
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However, instead of flipping these k locations to 1, the current values are inspected. If
all of these values are 1 already, then the element is known to be in the set. An example
bloom filter is illustrated in Fig. 3.5 with k = 2 hash methods, m = 20 bits, and the elements
of the set {2, 6, 9, 11} have been inserted.
Because there are only m bits, and the index values used are modulus this m, there is
a relatively high chance of collision. In other words, the map sets of two different elements
may have a non-zero intersection, and a single map set may have duplicate elements.
Because of this, BFs are a probabilistic data structure in that they sometimes return false
positives when checking if an element is a member of the set. Secondly, BFs do not store
the data of the elements inserted, they only store the information about whether or not an
element has been inserted.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocols allow a sender to transmit part of its data to a second, ``receiver'' party, in a manner that protects both of them. To understand OT conceptually, imagine the sender party has two pieces of information A and B. The sender is
willing to reveal A or B, but not both (exclusive OR). OT allows the receiver to read A or
B but not both, and the sender does not learn which value the receiver has read! This is
commonly known as ``one-out-of two'' OT. The receiver must commit to a bit value, which
determines which value they will read (e.g., 0 for A and 1 for B). In this work, we implement an OT protocol similar to that described in Naor's and Pinkas' seminal paper [67].
As described in this work, OT requires a group Gg of order q, which is a sub group of
Zp∗ where g is a generator, p is prime and q is coprime to p. To provide p, q, and g, we
use a DSA key pair. In our implementation, the sender builds an n X 2 matrix essentially
comprised of n ``one-out-of-two'' oblivious transfers. Because each row is an instance of
``one-out-of-two'' OT, the receiver will specify a ``selection bit'' for each row, to determine
which of the two values to access. We refer to all of these selection bits collectively, as the
``selection vector'' or ``sel.'' Although the sender will send the entire matrix (encrypted),
OT guarantees that the receiver will only be able to recover one of the two values in each
row of the matrix. If the selection bit for that row is ``1'', the receiver can recover the value
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in the first column, and if it's ``0'', the second column. As stated before, the sender will
not know which values the receiver actually recovers. For more detailed information on
the nature of OT, please refer to [67].

3.4.2 BF and OT design
Our second approach is much faster for two reasons. First, because it does not rely on
expensive homomorphic computation (specifically, multiplication as seen in Eq. 3.5 and
exponentiation as seen in Eqs. 3.2 and 3.3 on large cipher-text values) the computation is
faster. And, second, because we use a traditional TCP / IP server, with a custom server
middle-man implementation, we are not limited by Facebook's messaging throughput.
However, the setup is very similar. Alice generates her path set and Bob generates his
wall set based on a longitude and latitude binary tree as described in Section 3.3.3. At
this point, the goal is for Alice and Bob to privately determine if these two sets intersect.
We now diverge from the original protocol. All of the following is repeated twice. First for
latitude values, and then again for longitude values.
Alice and Bob each generate a total of three BFs, all of which use the same k hash
functions, and have the same length m. Alice generates one BF, BFa , in which she inserts
all the elements of her path set. Bob generates two BFs, BFb0 , and BFb1 . In BFb1 , Bob
inserts all the elements from his wall set. Then, Bob generates a new temporary set
consisting of all the possible path set nodes that Alice may have, assuming Alice is near
Bob, i.e., within Bob's policy. We call this set the super path set. In Fig. 3.4, the super
path set would consist of all the nodes shown, because Alice may be at any of the leaf
nodes shown in the figure. These elements are inserted into BFb0 . The key insight here
is that, at this point, assuming Alice is near Bob, he can use BFb1 to find indices in BFa
that must be set to 1 and similarly BFb0 to find indices in BFa that must be zero.
An illustration of the bloom filters (k = 2 and m = 20), along with a simplified example
tree segment, is given in Fig. 3.6. Here Alice is at node 2, so her path set = {2, 6, 9, 11},
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which are each inserted into BFa . Bob is located at node 3 ,and his policy only includes
nodes {2, 3, 4} therefore his wall set is {2, 7}, which are inserted into BFb1 . In order to
intersect with Bob, Alice must have either node 2 or 7 in her path set. Therefore, the
mappings of either 2 or 7 must be 1 in both BFb1 and BFa . To find the elements for
BFb0 , Bob finds all the nodes in all possible path sets. In other words, Alice may be
at node 4, with path set {4, 7, 10, 11} or she may be at 3, with path set {3, 7, 10, 11} or,
she may be at 2 (in fact she is at 2) with path set {2, 6, 9, 11}. The union of these sets
{2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11} is used to fill BFb0 . Alice may be at node 1, but in this case Bob
would not consider her nearby, so this case is not included (similarly with 5). Because
Bob has added any possible location of Alice, assuming she is nearby, any bit in BFb0
that has not been flipped to 1, should similarly not have been flipped in BFa , and therefore
Bob can use BFb0 to indicate places in BFa that should be 0.
BFb1

BFa

wall set: {2, 7}

path set: {2, 6, 9, 11}

0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

11

BFb0

9

10

super path set: {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11}
6

0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

7
2

3
A

8
4

5

B

Figure 3.6: Example BFs and tree segment. Because the element 2 is present in BFb1 and BFa ,
then the 1's in BFb1 , from the map set of 2, correspond to the same locations in BFa . Additionally
for any 0 location in BFb0 , the same location is 0 in BFa .

3.4.3 Protocol
From this point on, Bob must present several challenges to Alice about the contents of
BFa . However, in so doing, he must a) not reveal any information about his own location,
and b) assure Alice that he is not learning her location unless they are near one another.
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In order to do this, oblivious transfer (OT) is used. An illustration of the protocol is given in
Fig. 3.7. Throughout this section, we give the high level steps from Fig. 3.7 in form: X. .
First, Alice establishes a connection with the middle-man server and sends an ``a''
query indicating to the server that Alice wants to connect with Bob specified by ip_addr
1. . The server then establishes a forward such that any data sent from Alice will be
redirected to Bob and vice-versa, any data from Bob will be redirected to Alice.
Then Alice creates a DSA public key and sends the components, p, q, and g to Bob.
Bob creates a subset of bloom filter index values we call the ``selection table'' and a
y
selection vector, illustrated in Table 3.1, which he sends back to Alice 2. . We use BFbx

to denote the index of the yth ``1'' (``0'') in BFb1 (BFb0 ). Bob chooses 4 ∗ k ∗ l spots in
total where l is the size of Bob's wall set, and k is the number of hash functions used in
the various BFs. k ∗ l of these indices will be index locations in BFb1 that contain a 1 and
another k ∗ l are locations in BFb0 that contain a 0. Then, another 2 ∗ k ∗ l are random or
``fake'' indices. All 4 ∗ k ∗ l values are randomly shuffled into the selection table (right side
of Table 3.1), with the corresponding selection vector (sel). It is important to note that the
selection vector determines the location of the real value in the table. The selection table
1 = 2,
is then sent to Alice, excluding the selection vector. In the example in Table 3.1 BFb1
2 = 4 because the 1 element in BF , 2, maps to indices 2 and 4 according to
and BFb1
st
b1

the BFs given in Fig. 3.6.

2∗k∗l

1

1
BFb1



2

BFb1




fake



fake
1
 BFb0




fake




fake


4
BFb0

0
fake
fake
3
BFb1
4
BFb1
fake
2
BFb0
3
BFb0
fake

sel
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1

shuf f le

−−−−−→

1
fake
2
BFb1
1
BFb0
fake
1
BFb1
fake
4
BFb0
fake

0
3
BFb0
fake
fake
4
BFb1
fake
2
BFb0
fake
3
BFb1

sel
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

Table 3.1: Example selection table of index values. On the left, the table is constructed in two
columns of 2 ∗ k ∗ l values. The selection vector is given in the third column. The table is then
shuffled (on the right) and sent to Alice, excluding the selection vector.

At this point, Alice uses the received selection table of index values to lookup bit values
in BFa and places the corresponding values from BFa in a ``bit value table''. For the
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example in Fig. 3.6 and Table 3.1, Alice's bit value table is given in Table 3.2.
1
fake
2 =4
BFb1
1 =1
BFb0
fake
1 =2
BFb1
fake
4 = 18
BFb0
fake

0
3 =9
BFb0
fake
fake
4 = 14
BFb1
fake
2 =6
BFb0
fake
3 = 12
BFb1

sel
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

→
−

1
1 or 0
1
0
1 or 0
1
1 or 0
0
1 or 0

0
0
1 or 0
1 or 0
0
1 or 0
0
1 or 0
0

Table 3.2: Alice's bit value table (right side) derived by looking up the bit values of BFa given the
3
indices in the selection table (left side) provided by Bob. Example: BFb1
is the first hash location
of element 7 in BFb1 , which is 12. Index 12 in BFa = 0.

Alice generates a random value Ci ϵZq for each row of the matrix and sends these
values to Bob. Bob then chooses a random 1 ≤ u ≤ q and creates two public keys
P Kσ = g u and P K1−σ = Ci /P Kσ for every row of the matrix. Here σ = selection bit at
row i. For each row, P K0 is sent to Alice, which she can use to compute the missing
P K1 = C/P K0 3. . She chooses two random numbers r0 and r1 and, using the table of
bit values, encrypts the left column as E1 and the right column as E0 .

E1 = g r1 , H(P K1r1 ) ⊕ val

(3.6)

E0 = g r0 , H(P K0r0 ) ⊕ val

(3.7)

Here, H() is a hash function and val is the value from the corresponding spot in the
table of bit values. The values are sent to Bob, and he can then compute H((g rσ )k ) =
H(P Kσrσ ) and uses it to decrypt Eσ 4. . Here σ is the bit from the selection vector for the
corresponding row being decrypted. The selection vector (known only by Bob) determines
which parts of the encrypted table Bob can recover. That is, for each row, if the selection
vector bit is 1, Bob can only decrypt the left column value, and if it is 0, he can decrypt
only the right column value. Because Alice does not know the selection vector, she cannot
deduce which values are fake and which are real. Bob then ensures that for one of the
values in his wall set, all of the corresponding bit values (the entire map set) are ``1'',
indicating an intersection and alerting Bob that Alice is near him.
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Alice

Server

Bob

a:ip_addr

Section repeated for latitude and longitude

1

Forwarding Initialized

ack−a

DSA Public Key (p, q, g)
2

Selection Table

C1 , C2 , ..., C2∗k∗l
3

4

P K1 , P K2 , ..., P K2∗k∗l
Enc(Selection Table Values)

Figure 3.7: OT Protocol. First Alice sends a message to the third party server to establish a
forward to Bob. Then, the OT protocol, as described in [67] is carried out using an DSA key.

This is repeated once for latitude and then again for longitude values and if Bob finds
that there is an intersection in both cases, then he knows that Alice is nearby. He can
now safely transmit his precise location to Alice (encrypted).

3.5

Applications

We propose two applications, which we use in our evaluation in Section 3.8. In the first
application, (App1), Alice wants to learn Bob's location. However, Bob will only reveal
his precise location to Alice if he can verify that Alice is within a certain distance of him.
Private proximity detection is first used, using one of the protocols described previously,
and, if Bob can verify the distance between Alice and himself is less than Pb , then he
encrypts his location with Alice's pre-published public key, and sends the ciphertext to
Alice for decryption. Location based access control of Bob's location makes sense in this
application because Bob is relatively safe from targeted attacks, as the attacker effectively
must guess a location near Bob, in order to learn Bob's location. The application is similar
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to other popular applications such as Tinder [2], which displays users to one another if
they are in roughly the same area. However, it is private where Tinder is not.
Our second application (App2) is friend co-location notifications. Alice maintains a list
of friends, in her social network, for which she would like to receive a notification when they
become near her. In this application, one instance of private proximity detection is run
repeatedly for each of her friends, in parallel. When one of the protocol instances reveals
that the friend is near Alice, a notification is raised and Alice can contact that person
directly to meet up. It is important to note that the nearby threshold is set individually by
Alice's friends (various Bobs), which allows them to maintain respective levels of varying
privacy. The feasibility and practicality of our protocols in supporting these applications
is explored in our evaluation.

3.6

System Design Challenges

Pre-computing Encryption Keys Our system relies heavily on encryption for both private
proximity detection protocols and applications. In order to speed up our system, our client
software automatically pre-computes encryption keys, storing them in memory for use
later. As soon as the application is started, keys are generated in a low priority background
thread and stored in memory. The key generation thread sleeps between generating keys
and the sleep time grows exponentially with the number of keys already in storage so that
the system does not generate a surplus of keys, wasting memory.
Avoiding Unnecessary Array Copy Java provides many convenience methods and
tools, which ease development, but can cause significant performance issues. In our implementation, we initially used an ArrayList<TreeLeaf> to store the leaf-nodes (a custom
class) when creating the binary tree. We first generate the leaf node corresponding to
the user's location, then we generate a number of leaf nodes to the left and to the right
of the user's location node. Because the nodes on the left are inserted into the ArrayList
using ArrayList.insert(0, newNode); the ArrayList implementation performs an array copy
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on every insertion. We then updated our implementation to avoid situations like this, by
using primitive TreeLeaf[] data structures and iterating through the array in order.

3.6.1 Messages
In any distributed system, it is assumed that nodes can send messages between one
another. In our intended use case, the nodes are smartphones, which typically a) change
IP address frequently and b) are commonly behind firewalls, network address translation
(NAT) and other port blocking network infrastructure. Therefore, it is very challenging for
two arbitrary devices to establish a TCP connection with one another. In this chapter we
propose two solutions to this problem.
Facebook Messenger In our first solution, we allow the clients to connect through the
Facebook Chat API, depicted in Fig. 3.2. By doing this, users can do name/address resolution using the real names of their friends in the Facebook social network. The Facebook
Chat protocol is built on top of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP),
which features, among many other things, guaranteed delivery of messages. Users start
the application, set a username and password, and are able to log in to Facebook Chat
using our application directly. Once the user is logged in, they can be make queries
and be queried by others who have installed the application. Unfortunately, Facebook
enforces a 1000 character limit on messages on their XMPP Chat protocol, which we discovered empirically. In order to circumvent this limit, we are forced to split messages into
1,000 character packets, which we encode using a base-32 encoding scheme for better
efficiency.
When packets arrive, if the user is currently logged into Facebook chat using our application, the application will parse the packet. To distinguish our packets from normal
usage, we prepend our messages with a special symbol: ``@@''. When Bob sends messages to Alice, for the first private proximity detection protocol, they are in the form:

< @@T : sess : E(C1 ), h1 , ..., E(Cn ), hn , pk >
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(3.8)

Here, @@T is the packet type T preceded by our implementation's special character,
and sess is the session number. Each E(Ci ) is the i-th encrypted coefficient, and each hi
is the corresponding height. pk is Bob's public key, which Alice uses to encrypt her path
set values to perform the homomorphic computation of the polynomials. The type number
T allows the receiver to determine what stage of the protocol this packet is intended for.
For example, a type 2 packet contains the encrypted coefficients from Bob's longitude
polynomials. Nine different parcket types are used to handle the different stages of the
protocol, which are omitted for brevity.
Third Party Server Messenger Alternatively, we implemented a simple third party
server used for message passing only. Because the server does not move, it can be
given a static, public facing IP address and ports can be open specifically for our intended
application. Then, both clients connect to the third party server, which simply forwards
messages between the two clients. In order to establish a connection, two clients first
must open a TCP connection with the server. Then, the server provides a simple protocol
for selecting another user (Bob) to initiate a query with. Once one user (Alice) selects
another (Bob) the message forwarding begins. Our messenger server, used in our evaluation, is implemented as a python script, running on a departmental machine.
Bloom Filter Configuration In our implementation of the second protocol, the bloom
filters used are probabilistic, and some parameters must be chosen including how many
bits are used in each bloom filter, and how many hashes are used to insert an element.
We found empirically that using m = 262144 bits (32 KB) and k = 2 hashes results in a
false positive rate (FPR) of 1.6 ∗ 10−8 for BFa , 2.8 ∗ 10−9 for BFb1 , and 5.6 ∗ 10−6 for BFb0
on a typical 300m query. BFb0 has the worst FPR, because it is holding the, much larger,
super path set.
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3.7

Security Analysis

The goal of our system is to provide a private and secure PPD service. This section
analyzes the security of the system from the different perspectives of the parties involved.
Our protocols have one minor limitation, because the proximity detection is handled
in two rounds. When the first round has finished, Bob can determine whether or not Alice
is within Pb in longitude only. At this point, information has been leaked to Bob, who
should only learn location information about Alice if she is near him in both longitude
and latitude. He can fool Alice by continuing the protocol regardless of the result so she
cannot infer anything about Bob's location. Fortunately, the information exposed to Bob
is limited. He knows that Alice is within Pb of Bob in longitude only. As a result, he can
guess she is in a 2 ∗ Pb wide vertical band, centered on him, of latitude values all the
way around the Earth. This disclosure is relatively mild. There are still millions of latitude
values to guess. Due to the weak disclosure of this issue, we felt it unnecessary to modify
the system. We have implemented a trivial amount of protection in that the client software
does not reveal any information to the user until the protocol has finished. Only at this
point can it be confirmed that Alice is within Pb in both longitude and latitude.
We can solve this problem completely if we represent all the permutations of all possible < lat, lon > pairs in a single tree. This is substantially different then the current
system, which creates two trees, because determining which leaf nodes are within Bob's
policy becomes much more complex. Due to the complexity, the significant difference
from our current system, and the relative insignificance of the information leaked, we did
not attempt this approach.
Messenger Service Messages are passed in-band (i.e., over the social networking
service or third party server). We assume that the social network provider can see and
read all messages. However, information is not leaked to the provider, because our
system maintains that the sensitive contents of all messages are encrypted, and new
key pairs are generated for each query. The social network provider (or any message
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provider) may attempt to perform IP geolocation. However, IP geolocation is coarse
grained, and easily circumvented using IP address obfuscation techniques such as TOR
or a VPN. While the messenger service is able to launch a man-in-the-middle attack,
we can prevent this using some standard authentication mechanism, which is out of the
scope of this work.
In the worst case, the messenger service can sabotage the protocol by scrambling
messages or refusing to send messages. However, determining which messages are
related to the protocol, and which are simply users conversing, comes down to identifying
which messages are cipher-text and which are plain-text. This is non-trivial on a large
scale and yields little reward. Therefore, it is not practical for the social network provider
to do this. The third party messenger server may have a variety of different owners.
In fact, the user themselves may choose to maintain one. Because of this, we cannot
speculate on what the owner may consider ``practical'' but, at the same time, users can
simply choose to use a different server if they find one that is unreliable or they feel it
cannot be trusted. If a message passing service attempts to tamper with messages, by
modifying or inserting data, this can be detected using simple checksums such as parity
bits. Because the transmissions are encrypted, the service will not be able to modify the
message in a meaningful way and modify the checksum appropriately.
Alice In the first protocol, Alice receives, from Bob, the coefficients for a polynomial
rooted at Bob's wall set values. However, they are encrypted and, therefore, incoherent to
Alice. If these coefficients were in plain text Alice could easily determine the roots. Alice
may cache the encrypted coefficients sent to her in queries (from Bob). She might then
recognize the encrypted coefficients sent to her in future queries. This would only occur if
Bob was at the same location, with the same policy, and using the same key. Fortunately,
in our system we generate a new key for every query. By doing this we significantly decrease the likelihood of one user recognizing another re-using the encrypted coefficients
from a previous query. Bob also reveals height information about each coefficient to Alice.
Alice may be able to deduce Bob's policy from this height information, (larger heights indi39

cate a larger policy), but this disclosure is minimal and does not indicate to Alice anything
about Bob's location.
In the second protocol, Alice only receives the selection table, and a collection of public
keys (P Ki 's). The selection table partially reveals to Alice which nodes may be present in
Bob's wall set, partially revealing his location. She can brute force the solution by inserting
every possible tree node value into the bloom filter and matching the resulting locations.
However, because Bob inserts an equal number of arbitrary locations in the table, and
because some of the locations correspond to 0 locations (from BFb 0) Alice cannot know
which selection values correspond to his wall set nodes and Bob's actual location is still
well hidden. Among the 4 ∗ k ∗ l table values, only k ∗ l of them correspond to his wall set
values. Additionally, Bob can choose to increase the security by simply including more
fake location values in the selection table.
Bob In the first protocol, Bob receives from Alice her evaluations of the polynomial
and he has the polynomial (which he generated). Because this function is simple and
well-behaved he can determine the input necessary to generate the given output. This
allows Bob to determine Alice's location. In order to stop this attack we implement a
random number r which Alice uses after she has generated her wi values. ∀wi we modify
wi = (wi )r %n2 . If wi = 0 it remains 0. However, other values are hidden from Bob who
does not know the value of r.
In the second protocol, Bob receives from Alice a series of random numbers (Ci )'s and
the selection table with her 0 or 1 values. The Ci 's reveal nothing, and the selection table
reveals the values at the requested locations in BFa . Because all the bloom filters are
the same size and use the same hashes, Bob can brute-force Alice's location by inserting
every possible tree node into the filter. Bob knows what value Alice has at each of the
locations queried, so he must brute force node input until he finds which nodes set the
state of the bloom filter correctly. Fortunately, the size of the selection table is much
smaller than the size of the bloom filters, and there are many possible input series that
would result in the same selection table query result, thereby hiding Alice's location.
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Recent work by authors Olteanu et. al. suggests the idea of co-located users leaking
information about the same user to an adversary [74]. This relies on several assumptions
a) the victim must process queries from two or more users; b) these users must be ``near''
the victim ,and c) these users must be willing to share information about the victim with
the adversary. Due to these strong assumptions, this type of attack is not practical for an
adversary.

3.8

Performance Evaluation

In order to evaluate the performance of this system, we ran several experiments which
are detailed in the following subsections. The first subsection details the speed of homomorphic encryption on smartphones. In the second subsection, we examine the savings
from utilizing a binary tree. In the third subsection, we analyze the running time of our
system using both protocols, in order to determine the practicality for end users.
For all of these experiments, we used one or both of two Android OS based smartphones connected to the Internet using WiFi. WiFi is always used in our experiments
because of the excessive cost of mobile phone 3g or 4g data plans. The first phone p1 is
an LG-C800 with a 1GHz processor and 512MB of RAM running Android 2.3. The second
phone p2 is a Samsung Nexus S with a 1GHz Cortex-A8 processor and 512MB of RAM.
Our Paillier cryptography implementation was borrowed from the University of Maryland
Baltimore County [110].

3.8.1 Homomorphic Encryption
In the first experiments we wanted to determine if the weak ARM processors on typical
Android cell phones are powerful enough to perform Paillier cryptographic operations in
a timely fashion. A small Android application was written and used, which generates a
Paillier key, encrypts a user selected value, and decrypts the value. We ran this program five times, with a random value as input, and summarized the results in Table 3.3.
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We chose 1024 bit encryption because it is a good balance between security and speed.
To get a better estimate of the protocol's running time, we examine lower-level, cryptographic functions, shown in Table 3.4. Here one key is generated and the random value
is encrypted and decrypted once.
Key Size
256
512
1024
2048
4096

Run 1
123
208
1536
6773
91785

Run 2
75
139
1366
8105
44144

Run 3
82
374
1042
9453
31311

Run 4
74
134
933
8007
26047

Run 5
82
177
1158
3710
81108

Avg.
115.3
257.3
1176.5
6349.3
46415.2

Table 3.3: Time in milliseconds of generating a Paillier public, private key pair, encrypting a value
with the public key, and decrypting that value with the private key.

Run
1
2
3
4
5
Avg.

Key Gen
769
1601
624
756
1891
1128.2

Encryption
80
81
80
80
80
80.2

Decryption
147
147
146
151
146
147.4

Total
1006
1830
852
989
2118

Table 3.4: Time in milliseconds of generating a Paillier public, private key pair, encrypting a value
with the public key, and decrypting that value with the private key on an ARM 1GHz processor

During our protocol, there are only a few dozen encryptions / decryptions performed,
each one costing approximately 100ms and there are only two key generations, each
costing approximately one second. This shows that 1024 bit encryption is a good balance
of speed and security.

3.8.2 Binary Tree Efficiency
In the second experiment, we wanted to determine the savings we achieved by using a
binary tree data structure in order to encode the discretized location values. We ran the
protocol six times, on p2, while varying Pb . If the tree structure affords us a large saving,
the protocol will transmit less information and there will be fewer cryptographic operations.
In Table 3.5, we can see that, as the policy increases, the number of leaves increase. This
is expected, leaves = ((policy/10)∗2)+1. Bob's wall set grows at approximately O(log(n))
because of the nature of binary trees.
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Policy
Leaves
Wall Size
Message Length
Packets

30
7
3
1638
2

100
21
6
2867
3

300
61
6
2867
3

3000
601
10
4505
5

30000
6001
12
5324
6

160000
32001
12
5324
6

Table 3.5: Analysis of wall size as a function of Bob's policy. Also included,is the approximate
message length that can be expected for the given policy.

Paillier encryption generates cipher-text that is twice the bit length of the key [86]. We
use 1024 bit encryption so we expect cipher-text will be 2048 bits long. Messages are
trans-coded, for transmission, in a base 32 numbering system. As discussed in Section
3.11, messages are then broken up into 1000 character packets. Therefore, it is reasonable to see only a few packets generated from thousands of characters.

3.8.3 System Running Time
To get an idea of what users will experience when using our system, we implemented
and ran App1 (described in Section 3.5) running on protocol as an Android application.
We performed ten queries, for each of eight polices and measured the wall clock running
time of the query. The devices used were p1, Bob, and p2, Alice. In this experiment Alice
and Bob are at the same location (37.2701, -76.7119), which was selected randomly.
The results of these experiments are summarized in Fig. 3.8. We see a small anomaly;
when Bob's policy is 30000 meters the variance of the runtime is smaller. This is due to
the variant nature of the running time. In some runs the device will have less or more
contention for resources such as network, CPU, and memory. We left these resources
uncontrolled to emulate a more realistic use case.
We can see that the protocol runs in a reasonable time. Even a very large policy of
160km only takes [30 − 35] seconds to complete. More reasonable queries take tens of
seconds and very small policies require under 15 seconds. Because the user is alerted
via an Android notification when a query has completed and query progress is indicated
to the user while waiting, this is a reasonable waiting time [70].
To compare with our alternate, Bloomfilter and OT protocol, we performed the same
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Query Time

Time (seconds)
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Figure 3.8: Box plot of the total running time of the system. Our system takes on the order of tens
of seconds to run depending on the policy.

experiment, and give the results in Fig. 3.9, we see that the alternate system has smaller
variance in query time, and is much faster for queries less than 160km. Comparing the
mean query time of each system, shown in Fig. 3.10, we see that the alternate system
is much faster, except for the largest policy 160km, where the alternate system takes
about 50s to finish a query. This is due to the expensive construction of the super path
set. Because the super path set contains almost every node in the tree segment, it grows
quickly as the policy grows. In light of this, we tested the system on some more modern
hardware; a Nexus 4 with 2GB of RAM, a 1.5GHz processor, and a Nexus 7 with 2GB
of RAM, a 1.5GHz quad-core processor, both running Android 5.0. In this experiment
we are able to complete a query, with a policy of 160km, in only thirty-four seconds on
average.
Query Time (Alternate System)
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Figure 3.9: Box plot of the total running time of the alternate system.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of the query time between the original and alternate systems.

3.8.3.1

Message Transmission Speed

Our evaluation thus far has shown that our second PPD protocol performs better than
our first system. In this and the next section we aim to find the bottleneck(s) of our first
PPD protocol. We begin by examining the data transmission speed of our Facebook chat
message passing system used in the first system. We used one phone, p1, to send a
random string of characters, to a second phone, p2. p2 immediately responds back with
the same characters. p1 records the time it takes to send and receive the entire message,
(round trip time). p1 also records the time between receiving the first and last packet from
p2. This shows the overhead incurred by the packet size limitation. We performed the
experiment five times for each message length and plotted the results in Fig. 3.11.
Unsurprisingly, messages of 500 or 1000 characters take a short time to transmit;
median of 1.6 seconds and 1.8 seconds respectively. As the message length grows
larger, the round trip time and packet receiving time increases. In the bottom of Fig.
3.11, we can see plateaus in each pair of sizes (e.g., 2.5k and 3k, 3.5k and 4k, etc).
This is due to the 1000 character limit. A 3000 character message and a 2500 character
message are both broken up into 3 packets. When the message sizes are very large,
> 5000 characters, the volatility increases greatly. We can attribute this to the fact that the
Facebook message system is not designed to send such high volumes of data. Humans
typically converse at a few dozen characters per second.
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milliseconds

Round Trip Time
15000
10000
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0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
message size x’s 1000
Packet Receiving Time
milliseconds
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message size x’s 1000

Figure 3.11: Top: Round trip time, in ms, of sending a random message. Bottom: packet receiving
time, in ms, between receiving the first and last packet. For each size, a random message was
generated and sent five times (round trip).

3.8.3.2

Message Size

To evaluate how much data is sent during a typical query using protocol one, we ran
sets of ten queries varying Bob's policy, similar to our experiment in Section 3.8.3, on p1
and p2. During each query we recorded the total bytes transmitted and received by Bob,
(p2). It is safe to assume that the traffic on Alice is accurately reflected at Bob, because
Bob and Alice are the only two parties communicating. The results of this experiment are
summarized in Fig 3.12.
4
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Bytes

6

Query Transmission Magnitude

x 10

Rx
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4
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Figure 3.12: Transmission size of a query as measured by Bob.
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Because the Android API only provides a measure of total bytes transmitted or received, our results include some small background data transmissions from other miscellaneous applications and services (e.g., email sync, automatic application updates). Also,
the size of the cipher text transmitted varies slightly. Different keys will generate different
cipher text values, requiring more or less characters to represent, given the same input.
To capture these variations, the standard deviation of each set of ten queries is presented
in Table 3.6. Our system takes only tens of kilobytes to perform a query, even for very
large policies. The standard deviation, which is a small fraction of the bytes transmitted,
demonstrates that our protocol is stable in data transmission size.
Policy
30
100
300
1000
3000
10000
30000
160000

Rx Standard Deviation
2441.8
1257.7
1283.7
1338.2
1776.4
3186.4
1877.0
2905.2

Tx Standard Deviation
54.4
79.4
113.9
223.6
133.8
122.7
458.9
404.8

Table 3.6: Standard deviation of the transmission size.

Combining all the results from Section 3.8, we conclude that the largest bottleneck
in our system is message transmission, which takes up the vast majority of the query
time. As evidenced by the message size, and the experiments in Sections 3.8.3.1 and
3.8.3.2, this is because the Facebook Chat protocol is slow, not because our system sends
large amounts of data. Although all of our experiments utilize the mobile phones' WiFi
connections, our system is practical for mobile 3g or 4g data plans. Message transmission
speed is limited by the speed of Facebook Chat, only roughly 8k-bits per second. We can
easily increase this speed by using Facebook Chat to initiate a query, allowing Alice and
Bob to exchange references. We then offload all message sending to a third party server.
Here the bottleneck for data transmission would be 3g speeds, which are at least 384k-bits
per second [117].
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3.8.4 Scalability Analysis
Our system is concerned with one user querying the location of another. However, users
may want to learn their friends' location as soon as they are nearby (within Pb ) as described
in App2 in Section 3.5. We face many challenges when trying to scale our system up for
many users in use cases like these. Each query takes approximately 40 seconds and 80
KBytes in the worst case using our first protocol, which means Alice can send queries at a
maximum rate of 90/hr. and 7.03MB/hr. In the most naive approach, where Alice queries
one user at a time repeatedly, it will take over three hours in the worst case for her to be
alerted when a friend is nearby if she has 300 Facebook friends.
To scale our system we can make several key improvements. Firstly, we note that
Alice can query many of her friends in parallel. That is, she can send messages using
Facebook chat to query all of her friends simultaneously. In this way, Alice doesn't wait
for each query to finish before starting the next one. If she does this, several other factors become the bottleneck. Alice will need to to generate one key for each friend, and a
second key if the query is successful to send the location coordinates. To save time, we
can pre-compute many keys and store them locally. Keys are only 1024 bits long, so a
table of 10,000 pre-computed keys will only take up approximately 1MB of local storage
and access to them will be instant. In our protocol, in the worst case, Bob will have a
policy of 160km, which means he will generate a wall set of twelve nodes, or 5k characters. Bob will send this to Alice. Using our third party server for communication, and
opening many connections, Alice can accept all of this data in parallel from each of her
Facebook friends. However, her 3g bandwidth will limit the transfer to roughly 384kbit/s,
the minimum speed set forth by the ITU [117]. So sending these encrypted coefficients
will take 31 seconds with 300 friends. Once Alice has received these coefficients, she reconstructs and evaluates the polynomials which require multiplications of all the values.
The time to perform these multiplications is negligible for the BigInteger java library with
relatively small values. Once the values are calculated, they're sent back to Bob who
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decrypts to see if any of the results are zero. This incurs another 31 seconds of transfer
time by opening multiple connections. Because each Bob is doing the decryption independently, it's effectively in parallel and only adds roughly one second to the running time.
The data transfers, multiplications, and decryptions are all done twice. Once for latitude
and again for longitude. Therefore, it will take between two and three minutes to complete
the protocol for 300 friends.
Once this is completed, Bob knows if Alice was nearby and he can use her public
key (sent to him in the final transmission) to transmit his actual location values. In the
worst case, all of Alice's friends are nearby, and Alice must receive another set of 300
messages. Fortunately, the final location messages are small, only taking up about 1k
characters. So this transfer only takes about one second. By showing that protocol one
is able to achieve this result, there is little need to show that protocol two, which is more
efficient per query will perform equal if not better. Therefore, it is safe to assume that both
protocols will be able to serve this application in a practical or ``fast-enough'' time.

3.9

Conclusion

In this chapter we extend our previous work [71], which provides private proximity detection through private set intersection. Our previous work establishes this using Paillier
homomorphic encryption. Our implementation of this system is done on the Android platform and uses the Facebook online social network for blind message passing. We also
present a second private proximity detection protocol. The new protocol uses oblivious
transfer, bloom filters, and a third party message passing server to greatly improve on the
query speed. It is our hope that these two protocols can be used to build popular social
location based services in order for ordinary users to enjoy the convenience of proximity
detection and location services without worrying about the implications of strangers, or
online service providers, gaining access to their location data. Our systems can be deployed as a layer in another location based service. The source code of both protocol
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implementations is freely accessible online for users to install or make improvements on
[72].
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Chapter 4

Ultrasound Proximity Networking
on Mobile Devices
Our second contribution is a system that provides proximity networking based on ultrasound in smart devices. By improving security and privacy of communication at the physical layer, we allow users to share information, such as URLS, encryption keys, or mobile
payment information on commodity devices.

4.1

Background

With smart mobile devices now so common, users are beginning to demand a simple,
secure way of exchanging sensitive information with those around them. A key application example is sharing a phone number. While one user may be willing to tell another
her number, they may not want random third parties and eavesdroppers to overhear it.
To support this, and a wide variety of other applications such as exchanging email addresses, sharing pictures and links, exchanging credit card numbers for mobile payment
systems, authenticating access to a physical space, and controlling Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, we propose the use of ultrasound on commodity, ubiquitous smart mobile
devices (similar to [12]) for data transmission. We aim to provide this functionality, also
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known as proximity based networking, to users in a way that is fast, easy, and does not
require special hardware beyond users' phones.
Currently, proximity based networking is achieved through the use of Near Field Communication (NFC) radios [19], Bluetooth (BT), or WiFi (ad-hoc mode / WiFi direct). One
major drawback of NFC is that it requires special radio hardware in users' devices and
adoption of this hardware has been steady, but slow [91]. It is also known to have some
security problems [32, 128]. WiFi direct and Bluetooth both are more common on smart
devices, but they are relatively long range, which makes eavesdropping and man in the
middle attacks easier. Bluetooth implements a manual pairing protocol at a low level,
which cannot be easily avoided and WiFi direct necessitates special hardware (to host
the connection), and the users must not be associated with any access point (AP). Additionally, the WiFi spectrum, 2.4GHz, is becoming increasingly crowded. However, the
key drawback of these existing technologies is that they are omni-directional and therefore require some sort of pairing or private key exchange. Our proposed ultrasonic audio
modem has inherently narrow propagation, due to the nature of high frequency sound,
which allows for intuitive aiming of the transmission to the intended receiver. It does not
require any pairing protocols, or prior key-exchange / key-management making it ideal for
effortless sensitive information exchange.
Utilizing an ultrasound modem, on smart mobile devices, lends itself naturally to this
problem for several reasons. First, the necessary hardware (speaker and microphone)
and sample rate (44.1kHz) are already ubiquitous on commodity smart mobile devices
meaning that our solution does not require any change to the industry, and supports the
bring your own device paradigm. Second, ultrasound has a fundamental and intuitive security edge, in that it is directional, cannot pass through walls, and it has a limited, easily
configurable transmission range of a few centimeters allowing users to aim their transmission at the intended receiver. No encryption key management is necessary. Third,
ultrasound is inaudible by definition and therefore, non-disruptive to users.
In implementing our ultrasound modem we face several challenges. First, we must
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modulate sound waves in a way that supports fast data transfer, yet minimizes audible
noise. This turns out to be a significant challenge because simple carrier wave modulation
manifests as audible sound. Our second challenge is that typical devices have relatively
poor frequency response in the ultrasonic spectrum due to the low cost and compact
speakers and microphones they use. This means that we cannot reliably recover the
amplitude of specific frequencies with fine granularity. Third, we find that recovering the
phase is quite difficult, because we operate near the Nyquist frequency. Our system is the
only academic work, to the authors' knowledge, to rely exclusively on ultrasonic tones for
high speed communication between smart devices, with the goal of remaining inaudible.
It achieves the highest throughput of any existing approach.
The current state of the art in this domain is a system titled ``Dhwani'' [88], which
attempts to transmit data using sound as a wireless communication medium as well. The
authors use quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) on a 6kHz carrier achieving 2.4kbps
in the best case. Our system operates in the ultrasonic spectrum (to avoid disrupting
the user), which introduces several challenges. QPSK results in a very high error rate in
this spectrum, due to the limited sample rate on commodity devices. Our system instead
incorporates amplitude and binary phase shift keying, combined, using a novel analytic
phase recovery technique to achieve a higher throughput. We also go to great lengths
to ensure that our modem does not create disruptive or irritating noises that arise from
modulation.
The design of our modem has several key components. We design schemes to decode both amplitude and phase changes. We make many key design choices to reduce
transmission errors, and we experiment with a wide variety of modulation techniques to
remain as inaudible as possible. An extensive evaluation is presented that demonstrates
the speed, audibility, and energy use of our modem. Although our number one goal is
private exchange of sensitive information, it is our hope that our system can be used by a
wide array of ubiquitous computing applications in the future, such as sharing a link with
several members at a meeting, neighbor discovery, home automation, and gaming. Be53

cause our system assumes users have common (already ubiquitous) devices, it is very
valuable in many ubiquitous computing applications where assumptions about special
hardware cannot be made. Our contributions can be summarized as the following:
• We propose the use of ultrasound as a means of data transmission for proximity
networking on commodity mobile devices. We are the first to closely examine the
different modulation / demodulation schemes for high data rate communication while
remaining inaudible.
• We design and implement several novel and non-trivial techniques to overcome a
variety of challenges working in the ultrasound spectrum including utilizing orthogonal frequency devision multiplexing (OFDM), volume fading for inaudibility, adaptive
amplitude recovery in the face of poor frequency response, analytic phase recovery
to overcome sub-sample syncopation, and dynamic sender power to control multipath and increase security.
• We present an extensive evaluation of our system based on our prototype implementation working in the inaudible spectrum [18kHz, 21.5kHz]. We show our system is low energy, low noise, fast, and practical in several applications. Our best
effective transmission rate is 6.1kbps, with 0.2% bit error rate (BER), before error
correction.
We propose several techniques to overcome the challenges we face in implementing
this system, which are highlighted throughout this chapter. We use phase spreading and
volume fading to reduce audible noise. To overcome non-uniform frequency response
we propose dynamic amplitude recovery and in response to the poor phase resolution
from the limited sample rate, we propose analytic phase recovery and phase calibration.
Finally, we show that multi-path can be reduced and security can be enhanced by using
dynamic sender volume.
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4.2

Challenges

In this section we detail four technical challenges in implementing our system on common
smart mobile devices, each of which we overcome with a specific technical contribution.
First, transmitting data while remaining inaudible. Second, we face poor frequency response in the ultrasonic spectrum. Third, phase recovery is difficult due to limited sample
rates. Finally, multi-path effects (i.e., echo) are a challenge, because ultrasound is highly
reflective.
Inaudibility Designing a system that achieves high throughput, and low audibility is a
challenge. The common method of data transfer is to produce a sine wave with frequency
f and phase θ. The sine wave's frequency, amplitude, and phase are all changed over
time to encode information (modulation). This sine wave is sampled, digitally as S =
s1 , s2 , ..., si using Eq. 4.1, where the time t is derived from the sample rate Fs and index
i, (t =

i
Fs ).

si = sin(2 ∗ π ∗ f ∗ t + θ)

(4.1)

The fundamental modulation schemes, in which amplitude, frequency, or phase are modulated separately, are referred to as binary amplitude shift keying (BASK), binary frequency shift keying (BFSK), and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) (illustrated in Fig. 4.1).
We quickly discovered that these modulation schemes produce audible noise, even if the
carrier sine wave is above the audible frequency threshold (e.g., higher than 20kHz), due
to the modulation pattern. This can be most easily visualized in the case of BASK. In
Fig. 4.2 we plot a BASK signal which encodes a repeating bit pattern. The periodic amplitude changes generate an audible ``artifact'' wave, shown in bold, equal to the envelope of
the signal. If the bit pattern is regular, as is the case in our example, the artifact wave will
be a specific frequency. When the bit pattern is random, which is the case for our intended
application, the artifact wave is similar to white noise with many random frequencies.
Audible artifacts are also caused by any instantaneous changes in the waveform (near
sample number 41 in the plots of Fig. 4.1). The speaker's diaphragm physically moves
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Figure 4.1: Example sine wave modulated in amplitude (left), frequency (middle), and phase
(right).
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Figure 4.2: Imaginary wave (black) generated from ASK

synchronously with the path of the sine wave (in one dimension), so discontinuity causes
the speaker to produce on audible ``click'' noise. To overcome this challenge, instead
of encoding bits in the time domain, we focus instead on encoding information in the
frequency domain, using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), which has
much less frequent discontinuity. We also utilize two unique techniques to further reduce
noise called phase spreading and volume fading.
Poor Frequency Response The frequency response of cell phone speakers and microphones is highly volatile. The physical size of cell phones limits their speaker and microphone quality and as a result, audio signals are heavily distorted. This is compounded
by the complex interaction between frequencies when the speaker is reproducing many
simultaneously. To demonstrate this problem, we generated frequencies, 50Hz apart in
the range [18kHz - 22kHz] and [5kHz - 8kHz], one at a time on an Android smartphone
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(model Nexus S) with a power level of

14
16 .

We recorded the sound using a second An-

droid smartphone (model LG-800) and we plotted the recording, in the frequency domain,
in Fig. 4.3. These experiments show that the smartphones we tested are much better at
producing tones on the lower end of the spectrum (in line with [88]).
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Figure 4.3: Frequency response of typical cell phones.

Recovering Phase Accurately Recovering the phase accurately is difficult for three
reasons. First we will be operating above 18khz, but the sample rate of our devices
is limited to only 44.1kHz. Because our frequencies are very near the Nyquist frequency
(22kHz), there are only a few samples in each period. Therefore, when reading the phase
of a signal, an error of one or two samples, or even sub-sample differences, results in a
wildly different phase. An illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in Fig. 4.4. We
overcome this problem using a hail signal, to approximate the starting point, and a novel
technique called analytic phase recovery, which can recover the phase with sub-sample
accuracy.
Amplitude

18kHz Wave at 44.1kHz sample rate
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Figure 4.4: Due to the high frequency wave, and limited sample rate, the phase difference between adjacent samples is very large. For example, the phase difference between samples three
and four is nearly 2π.
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We also notice that the phase is typically corrupted during transmission. Similar to
the non-uniform frequency response, even if the sender encodes several sub-carriers
with the same phase, the receiver will decode many different phases. This is partially
an artifact of the Fourier transform we use to decode the signal, because the transmitted
signals are usually not symmetric. We refer to this as ``phase drifting.'' We overcome this
challenge by utilizing a technique called phase calibration, which we detail in the Analytic
Phase Recovery section. This problem is exacerbated when many different sub-carriers
are present with different amplitudes and phases. The sub-carrier frequencies interfere
with one another in the air, corrupting the signal. We explore many modulation schemes
to find the one with the best throughput in the face of this challenge.
Multi-path The final challenge we face is that of multi-path. Because we are operating
at high frequency, the sounds our modem emits are highly directional, due to the small
speaker size on our devices, and reflect easily off of surfaces. We solve this problem by
carefully controlling the sender volume so that it is strong enough to reach the receiver,
but weak enough that multi-path is too quiet to have a significant effect.

4.3

System Design

Our system exists as a modulator and demodulator. One or both of these may be running
on some hardware (For example; a base station kiosk, a mobile phone, or a building wide
centralized system). A device may be a sender or a receiver or both. But, the receiver
must have a microphone and the sender must have a speaker. A high level view of our
system can be seen in Fig. 5.2.
At the receiver side, sound comes in through the device's microphone and is first
parsed by the hail listener, which finds the approximate starting point of the data signal
among background noise. The raw data is then broken into chunks of size n and passed
to the amplitude (ampD) and phase (phaseD) demodulators, which recover the bits using
the Fourier transform (FFT) module. The resulting binary data is then interpreted at the
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Figure 4.5: Conceptual view of our ultrasound modem

application level. In the case of sending data, the user inputs some data to be sent, which
is broken into chunks of 65 amplitude and 65 phase bits, which are passed to the OFDM
modulator. The OFDM modulator generates an ultrasonic audio signal, by modulating the
amplitude and phase of each sub-carrier appropriately. Then, the system adds a linear
chirp hail signal to the beginning and transmits the audio using the device's speaker.
Operating Spectrum We chose spectrum 18khz - 22kHz, because it is inaudible to
humans, and below the Nyquist frequency for most smartphones. Also, previous work
has shown that background noise in this spectrum is relatively low [43, 88].

4.3.1 Quiet Transmission using OFDM
Due to the constraints outlined previously, we cannot modulate a carrier wave directly.
Instead we work in the frequency domain. We generate data segments, each of which
is the sum of many sub-carrier frequencies. We compute each sample in a segment
according to Eq. 5.1.
si =

22kHz
∑

sin(2 ∗ π ∗ i ∗

f =18kHz

f
+ θ)
Fs

(4.2)

Using the Fourier Transform (FFT), we are able to determine the frequencies present in a
given set of samples S = {s1 , s2 , ..., si } and we can recover each frequency's amplitude
and phase, which encode the data. This is commonly referred to as orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM). In order to recover the amplitude and phase of frequencies
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with a granularity of 50Hz we need n = 882 sample segments (20ms at 44.1kHz sample
rate with no guard interval) as input to the FFT. It is important to note that a perfect power
of two is not necessary thanks to the interpolation done by the MATLAB® implementation
of the FFT we used. This gives us 70 sub-carriers to encode data. Our sub-carrier construction is shown in in Fig. 4.6, which begins at 18.05kHz because 18kHz is a calibration
frequency. We then combine the sub-carriers (on the right side of Fig. 4.6) using Eq. 5.1.
In an attempt to improve throughput, we tested some modems which use 750 sample
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Figure 4.6: OFDM modulation scheme used. Each pair of bits determines the amplitude and
phase of the sine wave for the corresponding sub-carrier.

segments, which are shown in Table 4.4 in our evaluation. We choose not to implement
any clear cycle codes (cycle prefix) or similar techniques, because of the time they take,
which would reduce our throughput.
Calibration Frequencies Our modem uses frequencies 18kHz, 19kHz, 20kHz and
21kHz as calibration frequencies, which carry constant amplitude (100%) and phase (π).
We use these frequencies to account for the non-uniform frequency response and phase
drifting challenges we mentioned previously. This leaves 66 sub-carriers to encode data,
of which we use 65, achieving a theoretical bit rate of 6.5kbps.
Phase Spreading Fortunately, by utilizing OFDM, there is much less audible noise
created. However, there are still some audible artifacts, because at the transition from
one data segment to another, there is a small discontinuity. This occurs between every
data segment (roughly 50 times per second), and produces an audible click, of varying
amplitude, depending on the degree of discontinuity. This discontinuity is largest when
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many sub-carriers have a high amplitude and equal phase. In this situation, they experience additive interference in the first few samples, resulting in a large peak in the time
domain. This can be seen on the left side of Fig. 4.7. We can avoid this problem by
changing the phase of each sub-carrier frequency so that they do not combine at the beginning of the segment strongly. We propose a novel technique called phase spreading
in which we add three to each phase iteratively, as shown in Fig. 4.6. By doing this, we
guarantee that the frequencies interfere destructively in the first few samples, as can be
seen on the right side of Fig. 4.7. This reduces the audible noise, and the demodulator

Amplitude

can easily compensate for this change, since it is known.
1
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Figure 4.7: Left: Signal Before.

200 400 600
Sample Index

Right: After phase spreading.

Volume Fading Envelope To further smooth the discontinuity between segments,
√
the modulator applies an envelope according to a simple equation: s′i = a1 ∗ si . We call
this technique volume fading. Here a determines how many samples to fade. Choosing
a larger a value decreases the noise created, but alters the signal, increasing the error
rate when recovering the bits. We found a = 5 to be a satisfactory trade-off.
Hail Signal Our hail signal is generated by the hail generator module for the receiver
to a) realize data is going to be transmitted in the near future, and b) find the approximate
starting point of the data-modulated signal. To find the starting point with as few samples
as possible, to maximize throughput, we design our hail signal as a 300 point, linear chirp,
sine wave from 18kHz to 19kHz. It fades in and out in amplitude to minimize audible noise
and can be located with high accuracy due to the frequency change. Empirically, our hail
signal is able to achieve single sample accuracy. While more erratic hail signals may
be used to achieve better accuracy, ours is almost completely inaudible. We also tried
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a simple 18kHz static frequency hail signal, which had much worse accuracy (about 20
samples).

4.4

OFDM De-Modulation

The demodulator is responsible, at the receiver, for finding data-modulated signals in the
random background noise and decoding them. In Fig. 4.8 we can see an entire packet
transmission (top), and the first data segment (middle). Using the FFT module, the amplitude and phase of the sub-carrier frequencies in the segment are recovered (third and
fourth plot in Fig. 4.8).
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Figure 4.8: Transmission (top) shows the entire raw data transmission. Segment (middle) shows
the first segment after the hail signal. Amplitude (middle) shows the amplitude of the frequencies
(i.e., abs(FFT(segment))). An x marks ``1'' bits and a zero marks ``0'' bits. Phase (bottom) shows
the phases of the the frequencies. An ``x'' marks the places where the phase was read.
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Hail Listener The hail listener module, in the demodulator, continually listens to the
raw audio signal waiting for the volume to become greater than a pre-defined threshold.
When this is occurs, the hail listener runs a 300 sample, sliding window dot product (cross
correlation) between the received microphone data and the known hail signal. The cross
correlation between these two signals will be highest when they are synchronized. We
use this maximum as the starting point for the first data segment. The starting point of
the subsequent data segments are found using the known segment size n = 882 as an
offset. To recover the phase, we need better accuracy, which we detail in our analytic
phase recovery section.

4.4.1 Adaptive Amplitude Recovery: ampD
The amplitude demodulator takes a segment, in the frequency domain, as input. As mentioned earlier, and is clear in Fig. 4.8, the amplitude of each sub-carrier is non-uniform and
therefore difficult to decode. To overcome this challenge, we design a technique called
adaptive amplitude recovery which attempts to follow the trend of amplitudes. It first creates two queues, up-queue and down-queue, which contain the values of the previous α
``up'' amplitudes and ``down'' amplitudes respectively. The first frequency, 18kHz, is a
calibration sub-carrier statically held at 100% amplitude. We use this reading to bootstrap
our demodulator, placing the value in up-queue and placing a zero in the down-queue.
From this point on, each frequency is read and placed in the up-queue if the reading is
greater than thresh, which is defined below. Values less than thresh are placed in the
down-queue.
thresh = [(up-avg − down-avg) ∗ γ] + down-avg

(4.3)

Here *-avg is the average of the corresponding queue. γ is a parameter (between zero
and one) that determines where, between the up − avg and down − avg, the threshold
should be placed. The intuition here is that the threshold is placed somewhere between
the averages, which will follow the general trend of the varying amplitudes. At the end,
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frequencies in the up-queue correspond to ``1'' bits and frequencies in the down-queue
correspond to ``0'' bits. The threshold can be seen in Fig. 4.8 as the dashed line in the
amplitude plot. As the sub-carriers are processed, the queues are emptied to guarantee
they always contain only the most recent α readings.
Sometimes the ``up'' amplitudes are abnormally high, as a result the threshold is pulled
up very high and none of the subsequent ``up'' bits are recovered correctly. To fight this
phenomenon, we implement a third parameter, β. When an amplitude is recognized as
``up'', it is only placed in the up-queue if it is < β ∗ avg(up-queue). The system always
records a ``1'' bit, but β helps naturally remove outliers from shifting the up-avg significantly.
In our system, through manual investigation, we choose α = 2, β = 10, and γ = 0.35,
because they give satisfactory results on the variety of devices we tested with. Choosing
and exchanging these values automatically is left for future work.

4.4.2 Analytic Phase Recovery: phaseD
For phase modulation, we have attempted to implement two, three, and four level modulation. In order to decode phase, we split the available phase reading area into the
respective number of sections. Four level modulation is illustrated in Fig. 4.9. In this scenario, each level represents two bits. If the phase of the corresponding sub-carrier falls
anywhere in the level, we can decode the corresponding bits.
Recovering the phase is straight-forward, we simply read the angle of each sub-carrier
frequency from the Fourier transform of the segment. However, to decode the phase accurately, we must find the starting point with sub-sample accuracy. This is due to the problems outlined previously in the challenges section. The problem is exacerbated, because
the speaker of the sender and the microphone of the receiver are likely not synchronized,
resulting in sub-sample differences. To tackle this challenge, we use our novel analytic
phase recovery technique. The modulator sets the phase of 18k and 19k to be the same,
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Figure 4.9: Depiction of four level, phase demodulation.

because they are calibration sub-carriers. The phaseD module first finds the phase of 18k
(θ18 )and 19k (θ19 ) from the data segment directly. It then calculates the phase at 1000
sub-sample points before and after the starting point guess from the hail signal listener.
At each point, we use the sine wave formula, Eq. 4.1 to find the phase. The sub-carrier
frequency f is known, so we substitute in the relative time t and solve for θ. Each time
∆ = abs(θ18 − θ19 ) is calculated. We have found the starting point when the difference
between the two phase readings, ∆, is minimized. The phase of the sub-carrier frequencies can then be calculated the same way; substituting the appropriate frequency and the
starting point t which is now known (the t that produced the smallest ∆).
In contrast, Dhwani [88] is able to decode phase modulations without finding the precise starting point, because they're working at a much lower carrier frequency (i.e., 6kHz
- 7kHz). At these frequencies, there are three times as many samples per period so the
phase reading difference from adjacent samples is small and sub-sample differences are
negligible.
Phase Calibration As we move across the sub-carriers reading phase values, we
note that the phase values tend to drift due to noise, the non-symmetric input to the FFT
module, and distortion of the transmitted signal. To account for this drift, we propose a
technique called phase calibration. We set the calibration sub-carrier phase values to
constants in the modulator. To decode the phase we find dif f = θc − θf , where θc is
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the phase of the nearest calibration sub-carrier and θf is the phase of the desired subcarrier. Based on this difference, we can decode the phase. Phase readings are always
between 0 and 2π, but we may sometimes calculate a negative value of dif f . To solve
this problem, if dif f is less than zero, we add 2π. This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.9
for QPSK, which has four possible levels each 21 π wide, corresponding to two bits each.
Unfortunately, we found empirically that using four phase levels produced too much error
and instead utilize only two in our final modem. This is due to the limited sample rate on
our devices.

4.4.3 Error Correction Coding
We can expect some errors when transmitting. We use hamming error correction coding
(ECC) to correct single bit errors and detect multiple bit errors in each block [115]. Hamming codes allow for blocks of n = 2r − 1 bits, which contain a message of k = 2r − r − 1
bits, and r detection bits. Choosing r intelligently depends on the error rate, which we
investigate in our evaluation.

4.4.4 Alternative Modulation Techniques
When designing our system we put great effort into finding a modulation scheme that had
low error rate, high speed, and made minimal audible noise. We put in a lot of engineering work in order to extract as many bits as possible per second. Below we present the
theoretical bit rates of some alternative modulation schemes using the best possible circumstances; 80 sub-carrier frequencies with 58 segments per second ( 750 sample segments @ 44.1kHz sample rate). In our evaluation, we show the actual BER (Table 4.3)
and effective throughput (Table 4.4).
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4.4.4.1

Binary Shift Keying (BSK)

Our first approach was binary phase shift keying BPSK, and binary amplitude shift keying
BASK, (separately). Both of these systems are theoretically capable of 58 segments ∗ 80
bits = 4.6kbps.

4.4.4.2

Ternary Phase Shift Keying (3PSK)

This scheme uses three levels of phase modulation rather than two. Because we can
encode on average 1.5 bits in the phase of each sub-carrier, this scheme achieves a
theoretical throughput of 6.9kbps.

4.4.4.3

Quadrature Shift Keying (QSK)

QSK, which uses four modulation levels, had very high error rate for phase modulation,
and showed an even higher error rate for amplitude modulation. QSK has a potential
throughput of 9.2kbps.

4.4.4.4

BASK + BPSK

We treat BSK, 3PSK and QSK as primitives and try to combine them. Our first approach
was to perform BASK and then, on the frequencies present, perform BPSK (phase cannot
be encoded on a frequency with zero amplitude). Roughly half of the amplitude frequencies will encode a one bit, which means that the same frequencies can encode a phase.
On average we can expect to achieve

1
2

∗ 80 + 80 bits per segment, 6.9kbps. However

this system is highly volatile. If the amplitude bits are incorrectly decoded, the system
will attempt to decode the phase on the incorrect number of frequencies. This results
in a mismatch between the decoded and correct bit stream that propagates throughout
the data segment. We can solve this problem by inserting placeholder phase bits on the
sub-carriers whose amplitude is zero.
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4.4.4.5

BASK+BPSK-A

In this scheme we use a low, non-zero, amplitude level to encode ``0'' bits, so that we
can encode phase on every sub-carrier. The theoretical bit rate is 9.2kbps. This scheme
is very similar to our final design, except that it sends 58 segments per second, and
attempts to use all 80 sub-carrier frequencies. We show in our evaluation that this results
in an unacceptable error rate.

4.5

Implementation and Evaluation

We evaluate our system in five aspects. First, we measure the bit error rate (BER) and
perform ECC analysis. Second, we evaluate how sender power, and orientation can be
used to enhance security. Third, we do an energy evaluation. Fourth, we show how
our system performs in some typical ubiquitous computing application scenarios, such
as authentication access to a lab. Finally, we evaluate the audibility of our system. We
implemented a prototype of our modem on several android devices summarized in Table 4.1.
In order to run the Fourier transform fast enough, we borrowed a native C++ implementation, [48] and utilized the JNI on Android. Using this native code we are able to run
a Fourier transform of 1024 samples in roughly 1ms. To expedite the evaluation, we often used a desktop computer running a small collection of python scripts, and MATLAB®
R2013a to de-modulate the packets, measure the BER, and perform ECC analysis. We
were careful to ensure that this has no impact on the results of our experiments.
Name
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5

Make/Model
LG/C800
Samsung/Nexus S
Motorola/MB525
Samsung/Galaxy Nexus
LG/Nexus 4

RAM
512MB
512MB
512MB
1GB
2GB

Proc.
1GHz
1GHz
800MHz
1.2GHz
1.5GHz

Android Ver.
4
4
2.3
4
4.4.4

Table 4.1: Devices used for evaluation. We included the Motorola MB525 which is circa 2010 to
investigate how older and lower quality phones perform.
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4.5.1 Transmission Error
To get a basic idea of the error rate of our system, we performed ten transmissions of
≥ 1000 random bits at various distances, locations, and orientations. These results are
summarized in Table 4.2. (In this table, inline refers to holding the phones upright one
in front of the other and oriented refers to pointing the speaker of the sender directly at
the microphone of the receiver.) We can see that the error rate is generally acceptable,
Sender
p1
p1
p1
p1
p1
p1
p1
p1

Receiver
p2
p2
p2
p2
p2
p2
p2
p2

Orientation
inline
oriented
inline
side by side*
side by side
inline
oriented
side by side

Location
inside
inside
inside
inside
inside
outside
outside
outside

Distance
15cm
10cm
10cm
15cm
15cm
15cm
15cm
15cm

Trials
10 x 1kbits
10 x 1kbits
5 x 100kbits
11 x 1kbits
5 x 1kbits
5 x 1kbits
6 x 1kbits
5 x 1kbits

Power
14/16
14/16
11/16
14/16
14/16
14/16
14/16
14/16

Min Err.
0.40%
0.0%
2.06%
9.40%
3.20%
0.30%
0.20%
0.50%

Mean Err.
5.64%
0.33%
2.29%
22.64%
17.26%
1.96%
2.22%
2.40%

Max Err.
9.40%
0.80%
2.96%
32.50%
28.95%
3.50%
5.30%
6.80%

Table 4.2: Error Rate Evaluation. The high error in rows four and five can be attributed to multipath effects. The * indicates this experiment was performed with the devices held above a desk,
increasing multi-path effects even further.

in many cases below 3%. The long experiments (when 100k bits are transmitted in each
trial) we see much lower variance with an error rate near 2%. In the fourth and fifth
experiments, when the phones are held side by side inside, we see very high error rate.
This is caused first by the poor orientation of the devices. Because the high frequency
and relatively small speaker size, the sound is very directional, which means when the
devices are not aimed appropriately, the sender will receive a signal that is corrupted by
multi-path. This is supported by rows one and two. In the fourth experiment, a desk is
present, which increases the multi-path effect.

4.5.1.1

Alternative Modem Schemes

We performed more random transmission experiments using our alternative modem schemes
to find the error rate of each. The results, show in Table 4.3, helped guide our decisions
when designing our modem scheme. We find that only binary shift keying has acceptable error rates. To evaluate how well our system transmits data over different distances,
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Name / No.
BASK
BASK (const)
BPSK
3-PSK
QPSK
BASK+BPSK

Amp
0 ∨ 100
0 ∨ 100
100
100
100
0 ∨ 100

Phase
i*3
0
0 ∨π
4π
0 ∨ 2π
3 ∨ 3
0 ∨ π2 ∨ π ∨ 3π
2
(i*3) + (0 ∨ 1)

Amp BER
0.3%
22%
x
x
x
2.8%

Phase BER
x
x
0.8%
7.4%
20%
x

Table 4.3: Comparison of the various modulation approaches. Sending power: 12/16, distance:
15cm

we transmitted 1000 random bits, ten times, from p1 to p2 at three different locations,
five different distances, and using two different orientations. We used our BASK modem
and a data segment size n = 750, to get a baseline of what errors rates to expect in different scenarios. For each set of ten transmissions at a particular distance/location, we
recorded the BER and box-plotted the results in Fig. 4.10. These results show that when
the devices are nearby and oriented correctly the error rate is very good and eavesdroppers more than a few meters away, which the user is not oriented towards, have very
high error rate. The results in Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.10 together account for 852,000 bits
transmitted.
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Figure 4.10: Ten transmissions of a 1000 bit, random message at three different locations, two
different orientations. ``Sadler'' is public building on our campus.

4.5.1.2

Transmission Power

By increasing or decreasing the transmission power at the sender side, we can control
the error rate of the transmission. This is useful to reduce the effects of multipath, and
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to guarantee that eavesdroppers cannot hear the transmission. To evaluate the effect
of sender power, we transmitted 10k random bits five times for each of the 16 possible
power levels. In Fig. 4.11 we plot the min, mean, and max error rate for each set. From
this figure we see that at very small volume levels (1 - 4), the transmission error is very
high with high variance. This is because the signal to noise ratio is very low. At higher
sending powers (6-10), the error rate is very low. In the best case, level nine, the mean
error rate is 1.27%. Then, as the sending power increases (11-16) the error rate rises
again. This can be attributed to two factors. First, as the volume increases, the effects
of multi-path increase and second, producing very high frequencies at very high volumes
places a lot of kinetic energy in the physical speaker. Because the speaker does not have
perfect dampening, there is some residual noise after the signal has ended, caused by
the speaker returning to its resting, neutral position. These experiments show that be
selecting the correct sending power, we can reduce the effects of multi-path, increase the
security, and improve the error rate for the intended receiver.
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Figure 4.11: Transmission error rate, depending on the sender's volume. Distance: 15cm.

4.5.1.3

ECC Analysis

We selected a typical transmission test from row two, row three, and row eight, of Table 4.2
and calculated the effective transmission rate given various values of r. The results are
shown in Fig. 4.12 and Table 4.4. We include a density metric d =

throughput
spectrum ,

which is

to account for different amounts of spectrum used. Although it might appear that Dhwani
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achieves the best transmission rate (best density), it is important to note that our system
is operating in the spectrum from 18kHz to 22kHz. This spectrum is especially hard to
utilize because of the numerous problems outlined in the challenges section. Also, our
system is nearly inaudible unlike the Dhwani system [88]. SSCconnect [90] operates on
a similar spectrum to our own and, although it is commercial, offers a closer comparison
to our work. Their operating spectrum is 17kHz to 20kHz, which we avoided in fear that
17kHz sound may be heard by users with more sensitive hearing.
Effective Throughput after ECC
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7000
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Figure 4.12: Effective throughput after ECC analysis. The three datasets plotted represent a
random transmission from our previous experiments in Table 4.2 (rows two, three, and eight respectively).
Technique
Ultrasound (0.2% Err)
Ultrasound (2.1% Err)
Ultrasound (0.5% Err)
Dhwani 8-PSK
Dhawni QPSK
Dhawni BPSK
SSConnect
BASK
BPSK
BASK+BPSK
BASK+BPSK-A (n = 750)

Spectrum
3.5kHz
3.5kHz
3.5kHz
1kHz
1kHz
1Khz
3Khz
3.8k
3.3k
3.9k
3.5k

PSR
100.0%
84%
93%
80%
95%
100%
unknown
92.5%
95%
87.9%
71.2%

Effective Speed
6.1kbps
4.6kbps
5.5kbps
2.4kbps
1.6kbps
800bps
2.2kbps
3.4kbps
3.0kbps
4.2kbps
3.9kbps

d
1.75
1.32
1.57
2.40
1.60
0.8
0.73
0.89
0.91
1.08
1.11

Table 4.4: Packet Success Rate and Effective Transmission Speed. Power: 12/16 for the first
three rows, 14/16 for the final four. Distance: 15cm. ``Ultrasound'' is the modem as described in
Section 4.1

4.5.2 Security
An attacker may try to eavesdrop on the communication between two benign users. We
show that our ultrasound modem is not easily susceptible to these attacks for two reasons.
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First, it is relatively short distance. Second the transmitted signal is directional, giving the
user a powerful, unique, and intuitive way to indicate the intended receiver.
To verify this, we perform seven experiments to exhibit the users ability to inhibit the
successful transmission by aiming their device. We transmitted 50k random bits from p5
to p1, varying the sending power, and the sender's angle (pointing directly at the receiver's
microphone is 0◦ ). The results are given in Table 4.5. In the final experiment, the user
places their hand between the sender and receiver, which causes the BER to jump to
over 40%.
Sending Power
14 / 16
14 / 16
14 / 16
6 / 16
6 / 16
6 / 16
6 / 16

Angle
0◦
45◦
90◦
0◦
45◦
90◦
90◦

Bit Error Rate
0.59%
1.23%
2.66%
3.25%
12.18%
14.97%
47.34%

Table 4.5: BER with varying angle and sending power. In the final row the user's hand was placed
between the sender and receiver.

4.5.3 Ubiquitous Computing Applications
In order to investigate how our system performs under typical usage scenarios, we devised three additional experiments. In the first, two users each hold a device, shown in
Fig. 4.13(b), and use the system to send 10k bits, which is roughly equivalent to the size
of a small 50 x 50 pixel .jpg thumbnail / contact image with a phone number. We measure an average BER near 1.5% over five trials. For our second experiment, we set up
one device to act as a base station, shown in Fig. 4.13(a), to simulate scenarios such as
point of sale systems, personal authentication access to a lab, or Internet of things style
home automation. The base station in this case is always listening and uses a sliding
window root mean squared (RMS) algorithm to detect when a client is sending data. In
deployment, the base station is likely to have a direct power connection.
We used this system to transmit 1700 bits (similar to a credit card swipe [116]), re73

peated forty times and achieved an average BER of 1.31%. In Fig. 4.14 we choose transmissions from each of these two experiments, which demonstrate average error rate, and
calculate the effective throughput. Similar to Fig. 4.12 we vary the number of ecc bits r
to find the optimum.

(a) Basestation

(b) Two Users

Figure 4.13: Practicality Experiments Setup
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Figure 4.14: Effective throughput for typical transmissions using a base station and for two users
holding the devices. Power:12/16, Distance: 15cm. The best packet success rate (PSR) is 92.6%
and 90% respectively.

In our third experiment, we evaluate our modem using every combination of p1, p2, and
p3 as sender and receiver. For each combination, we send 1000 random bits five times.
We measure the BER and report the highest effective throughput after error correction
in Table 4.6. These experiments show that our system works well with different devices
carrying microphones and speakers from different manufacturers (Motorola, Samsung,
LG), which is common in a BYOD environment. Even our slowest effective rate, 2.9kbps,
74

is higher than any competitors' speed. When using the oldest phone, p3, we note higher
BER rates. Surprisingly, the same device also achieves the best effective transmission
of 6.4kbps as the sender.
Tx / Rx
p3 / p2
p3 / p1
p2 / p1
p2 / p3
p1 / p2
p1 / p3

BER.
0.1%
0.34%
0.46%
4.9%
0.5%
12.4%

r
9
6
6
4
6
3

PSR
100%
98.7%
95.2%
85.2%
90.7%
77.0%

Effective Rate
6.4kbps
5.8kbps
5.6kbps
4.0kbps
5.3kbps
2.9kbps

Table 4.6: Comparison using several different devices as sender and receiver. BER is the average
of five trials. Power: 12/16. Distance: 15cm.

4.5.4 Energy Consumption
To evaluate the energy consumption of our system we implemented WiFi, Bluetooth (BT),
NFC, and our ultrasonic audio modem using a sender power of

14
16 .

Using p2 as the sender

and p4 as the receiver, we utilized each interface and measured the total consumed energy, using a Monsoon power meter [40]. In Fig. 4.15 we present the energy consumed
on average per bit. It is important to note that the energy used by our system, roughly
32uAh / 1s, is actually small, causing roughly 56% increase over the idle rate of 57uAh /
1s.
Energy (uAh)

−3

x 10

Energy Per Bit

20
10
0
WiFi

Bluetooth
Ultrasound
Interface

NFC

Figure 4.15: Consumed Energy per bit utilizing different physical media interfaces.

4.5.5 Audibility User Study
We used p1 and measured about -19dB of sound over the background noise of -50dB
according to a dB measurement application [101] in a quiet office room. However, this
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measurement is not very insightful, because it includes ultrasonic frequencies, which humans can't hear.
To evaluate how much sound from our modem is perceived by the user, we asked
eight participants (mean age: 27) to listen to our modem. The modem sending volume
was set at 60%. The user is asked to listen to the modem transmitting random data
five times, and rate how much noise they heard on a scale of 1 to 100 each time. The
experiment was implemented as an Android application using a scrollbar, with end labels
''silent'' at 1% and ''fire alarm'' at 100%. The results are plotted as a histogram in Fig 4.16.
The highest rating (21%) indicates that our modem is very difficult to hear. The modem is
best described as a emitting a ``soft buzzing'' sound. Some participants made comments
that they felt they couldn't hear anything at all, and thought perhaps the modem was
malfunctioning.
Modem Audibility
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Figure 4.16: Histogram of user audibility rating. Results are color coded by user.

It is possible that our modem is more audible to young children, or animals, or that
ultrasound might have adverse or unforeseen effects on users in general. Recent studies
have shown that younger people are more sensitive to ultrasound [21, 49]. However, we
leave this for future work, as these questions are largely out of the scope of this work.
Young children and animals are not the target users, and the breadth and magnitude of
investigating these issues rigorously is extremely large.
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4.6

Conclusion

In this chapter we propose the use of ultrasonic audio as a physical medium for proximity networking. We overcome several challenges including poor frequency response,
and limited sample rate. Our evaluation shows that our system can achieve an effective
transmission rate of 6.1kbps with a PSR of 100% in the best case and 4.6kbps with 84%
PSR in the average case.
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Chapter 5

Physical Media Covert Channels
To provide better security and privacy at the operating system level, we present a novel
attack vector based on a technique we call physical media covert channels. These channels can be used to leak sensitive information from a users device. They are plentiful
on smart devices, because of the wide array of sensors they carry. Due to the fact that
they are not hindered by even state of the art, taint-analysis based defense schemes
proposed in recent research, it is necessary for the research community to create new
defenses against them. It is our hope that by exposing these new attack vectors, and
by providing a first step defense mechanism built into the operating system, we can spur
innovation in more robust and effective defense mechanisms before these attacks are
widely deployed by attackers.

5.1

Background

Since the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 mobile computing using smartphones and
tablets has exploded. There is currently a plethora of Windows, Android, and iOS devices
available to consumers containing a wide assortment of physical sensors. Consumers
have come to expect smart mobile devices as common place. They are now carried everywhere and relied on daily. This is proving to be a fundamental shift for computing in
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two ways. First, these devices carry an unprecedented amount of sensitive information
such as contact information, passwords, GPS location traces, financial information, and
personal attributes such as sexual orientation and health data. Secondly, smart mobile
devices are commonly equipped with a variety of physical interface hardware such as
accelerometers, cameras, vibration motors, speakers, and microphones. Users of smart
devices are expected to be conscious of a myriad of security best practices to protect this
data, such as using unique and strong passwords for their various services, enforcing
reasonable permission allocations to applications, and protecting highly sensitive information with encryption (or keeping this information off the device). These sort of defense
schemes are largely lost on users, and can be difficult to implement for developers [20, 76].
In this work we preemptively propose a new form of malware, tailored specifically to mobile computing, along with a first step defense mechanism in hopes to alert the community
of this potential threat and spur future research.
This work is interesting because we can exploit several properties of mobile computing. Firstly, the abundance of sensitive information found on these devices is highly
valuable to attackers. Passwords are an obvious example, but attackers may also try to
learn users' addresses and financial information, which can be used to steal their identity.
Users' political views or sexual orientations, can be used by oppressive governments or
organizations. Their personal traits and interests can be used to answer common second
factor ``security questions'' such as their childhood home, or pet's name. Secondly, we
exploit the variety of physical world sensors to establish several unique covert channels,
which we refer to as ``physical media covert channels'' (PMCC). Because of the architecture currently in place in mobile operating systems, we show that we can easily design
malware, using PMCCs, which appears benign fooling both non-expert humans and software systems seeking to eliminate malicious software; this makes it a variant of trojan
horse malware.
Designing and implementing the PMCCs we use in our malware is difficult, because
we must achieve two goals at the same time. First, speed. Previous work has shown that
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as little as 100 bits per second is enough to pose a serious threat, we show that at least
one of our covert channels can achieve a few thousand bits per second. Secondly, stealth.
The stealth of the covert channels is very important so they are difficult to defend against.
They must go unnoticed by the user, and appear to be benign from the point of view
of the software. Additionally, defending against these channels is challenging, because
we must differentiate between benign and malicious sensor use without interrupting key
features or annoying the user with confirmation dialogs.
Our attacks overcome not only the current, widely deployed defense mechanisms, but
also the defense schemes posed in recent literature. Most recent work in this area can
be divided into three areas: taint-analysis, elaborate security policy mechanisms, and application market curation. Taint-analysis can be used to identify sensitive information as
it flows through an application and notify the user or stop this sensitive information from
leaving the device and being leaked. Sensitive information sources are marked as such
(e.g., the user's contact list) and sinks are identified that will ultimately leak this information (e.g., the Socket API). Security policies can be written by users, or automatically, that
disallow certain types of malicious behavior. Market curation techniques aim to identify
and remove malicious applications from the market before users even have a chance to
install it. Our attacks overcome all of these approaches because of our physical media
covert channels, which are novel and difficult to differentiate from benign behavior accurately. Our defense scheme provides a framework, that can be extended in the future, to
identify and defend against variants of the malware we propose.
In this work we identify a new malware specifically designed for mobile devices. PMCCs used in the malware are constructed using the sensors found on smart devices. We
show that our malware can easily leak sensitive user information, such as bank statements, or location traces despite any current defense mechanism. Building such a system introduces several challenges including achieving a high bit rate, and low detectability
(stealth). We go on to propose a defense scheme against these attacks, which can be
implemented by the operating system provider, that aims to enable taint tracking over
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these channels. To summarize, in this project we make the following contributions:
• We propose a new class of covert channels for smart mobile devices that utilize real
world interfaces (e.g., the vibration motor and the accelerometer). We generalize
these as ``physical media covert channels'' and demonstrate that they can achieve
varying levels of stealth, and speed.
• We design, and implement five example PMCCs, which utilize ultra-sound, physical
vibration, light, and the user themselves. We spend extra effort on our ultrasound
channel to show that with some engineering effort we can achieve a very high transmission rate.
• We use our PMCCs to design a new variant of Trojan Horse malware, which appears to be benign but actually leaks sensitive user information. We give a specific
example called ``Jog-Log.''
• We propose and implement a novel defense scheme that takes a framework approach. The defense aims to propagate taint information across these channels,
while still maintaining high usability of benign applications.
• We evaluate prototypes of each covert channel and the defense mechanism. We
show that our fastest channel, the ultrasound covert channel, achieves 3.71kbps,
and our gyroscope channel is very stealthy. Our defense scheme maintains high
usability for the user, while stopping all of the proposed attacks with low overhead.

5.2

Threat Model

We assume the attacker is remote. He or she does not have any physical access to
the user's device and cannot alter the operating system, or any other software, already
running on the user's device. The attacker's goal is to convince the user to run their
malicious code, which is used to obtain some information about the user. By ``attain'' we
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mean that the attacker's code accesses some sensitive information, and transmits it, over
the Internet, to an attacker controlled host machine.
In order to send information out over the Internet in the malicious application, without
requesting the Internet permission, the attacker can exploit a simple capability leak, which
is a form of a confused deputy attack [28] using the web browser. Android applications can
ask the browser to open URLs on their behalf without declaring the Internet permission.
The attacker can include some CGI parameters (e.g., attackerhost.com/collector?usersecret=val)
to transmit sensitive information to their own controlled host. Although there are protections against these attacks [9, 57], they are not widely deployed. Furthermore, the attacker
can always just declare the Internet permission and communicate with their host directly,
although this is less stealthy to the user.
Creating Applications The attacker is able to implement Android applications which
are, from the point of view of the victim, normal applications. The attacker does not have
to provide the source code to these apps, distributing only .apk files, which are essential
.zip archives of java byte code and application assets such as image files and text files
containing localized strings.
In order to convince the user to install these applications, the attacker can employ
a few well studied techniques. Specifically, to circumvent application market curation
techniques [124, 126], a malicious application developer can employ obfuscation such
as utilizing native code, java reflection, remote code downloading, identifying malwaredetection environments [81], or other more sophisticated techniques [84, 16, 111]. This
allows the application to appear in application markets, drastically increasing the number
of people that will run it.
To be more specific, the attacker aims to build a trojan, which by definition, appears to
be benign from the point of view of the user, but actually performs some malicious activity.
The attacker can even implement complete benign functionality to produce a convincing
trojan.
Timing The attacker can employ standard Android timing mechanisms such as the
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``ScheduledExecutorService'', in order to execute certain portions of their code at certain
times of day (to increase stealth), and to ensure that two different components (possibly in
two different applications) run at the same time to facilitate covert channel transmission.
Accessing Sensitive Information As mentioned previously, there are many pieces
of information that may be considered sensitive on a typical smart mobile device. This
information can be organized into three forms based on how it is accessed.
First, applications maintain sensitive information and may expose it for use by other
applications. For example, the contact manager application maintains contact information
for other people. Typically individual contacts can be ``shared'' via an interface between
the contact app and another app (e.g. the SMS app may be able to access an individual contact to send the phone number of that contact to a friend). Typically this type of
information is guarded with some permissions. For example, to read the phone records
of the user, the application must declare the ``READ_CALL_LOG'' permission, which is
displayed to the user at install time. For first party applications such as the phone call
app, a permission is always necessary, for third party applications it is less common.
Secondly, certain hardware devices can provide sensitive information immediately,
such as the GPS radio. These devices are guarded by permissions, but other sensors,
which are not traditionally thought of as sensitive, do not require permissions to access,
such as the accelerometer and gyroscope.
Third, sensitive information can be extrapolated from these sources. For example, by
polling the GPS sensor regularly the attacker can likely learn the user's home address and
work address by examining where they are late at night and during the day on work-days.
These sort of inference or extrapolation attacks are plentiful in recent research [56, 108].
Attacker Limitations The attacker cannot access the hardware devices, such as the
accelerometer and microphone, except by going through the provided Android APIs. This
is enforced already in commodity Android due to user permissions, and SELinux. This
means that the attacker must abide by the permission system that governs these APIs
[39]. We also assume the attacker does not have root level access on the user's device.
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Figure 5.1: Information flow using physical covert channels.

We do not focus on the case where the attacker tries to use some physical media
covert channel to communicate with another proximal device. Although it may be possible
to form some sort of ad-hoc network out of nearby attacker controlled devices, we consider
this scenario to be largely impractical and unlikely.

5.3

Trojan Horse Malware Design

In this section we present a general trojan horse malware, specifically designed for commodity smart mobile devices that utilizes PMCCs. Our malware aims to appear benign
to users and software systems, while actually leaking sensitive user information to an attacker controlled host over the Internet. A high level view of the malware can be seen in
Fig. 5.1. The attack works in four phases. First the malware is installed by the user on
their personal device. Then it accesses some sensitive information, such as the user's
GPS location trace. Third, the malicious application component encodes the information and sends it out over a physical device. In Fig. 5.1 the vibration motor is used as
an example. At the same time, a second attacker controlled application component is
used in the background to gather samples from the corresponding sensor. This second
application component decodes the signal from the sensor, obtaining the original data
(untainted). Finally, the receiver application component sends this information to some
attacker controlled host on the Internet.
By ``laundering'' the information over a PMCC, we circumvent the current, widely
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adopted permission systems on mobile devices, which try to isolate the data of each application in respective sandboxes. Our channels allow applications to share information
without the OS or even current state-of-the-art defense schemes, (including those based
on taint-tracking [9, 22, 28, 45]), being alerted. Because none of the systems in recent
literature (to the best of our knowledge) account for transmission over physical media, our
covert channels pose a novel threat.

5.3.1 Example Trojan Application --- Jog-Log
An example trojan application might be a fitness app, which helps users track their running progress. The attacker's goal is to attain the user's home address. The application
implements a simple ``jogging journal'' which determines when, for how long, and where
a user jogs to help them track their progress. The application is closed source and is
submitted to a well known application market.
The user, interested in jogging, finds the app in the market and installs it. Because
they are weary of their information being leaked, they run the taint-droid system on their
device [22]. When they want to begin a run, he or she starts the application and the
GPS radio is used by the app to track the run. The application declares the permission
to access the GPS radio, but it does not request the Internet permission. The application
also requests access to the microphone to allow the user to add simple ``voice notes'' to
their journal entires (e.g., ``I was greeted with a beautiful sunrise this morning thanks to
my new jogging hobby!'').
Later, at night when the user is sleeping, the application uses the ScheduleExecutorService to wake up and use a PMCC to transmit the location information gathered
earlier during the most recent run. Specifically, the speaker is used to produce an ultrasonic signal. At the same time, the microphone is used to decode the signal in a second
component (part of the same application, running simultaneously in a second thread).
Because the information has been laundered over a PMCC, the original taint-tags asso-
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ciated with location have been lost. Then, the second component forms a URL with the
attacker's host as the domain, and the user's location as a CGI parameter and asks the
browser to open this page.
The attacker sets up a special web server to respond to these requests by recording
the CGI parameters in a file associated with the IP address of the user. Once the data is at
the attacker's host, the attacker can find the street address nearest the GPS coordinates
logged at the start and end of the user's runs, which is likely their home address.

5.3.2 Attack Variations
An attacker must control two application components, (e.g. a foreground activity and a
background service), one sender and one receiver, to implement a covert channel. These
components can be part of the same application, to circumvent taint-tracking analysis, or
two different applications, to circumvent taint-tracking and the current, widely deployed
permission system and information sand-boxing. If the attacker chooses to use two independent applications, they must convince the user to install both of them. To achieve
this, the attacker can craft these applications so they are related, with some combined
functionality and do in-app cross promotion. This is common practice with many developers in the Android ecosystem. The ``Go Launcher'' [107] and ``Yahoo Weather'' [123]
apps serve as just two prominent examples.
In our Jog-Log example, the attacker may instead choose to place the voice note
feature in a second, stand alone application and do in-app cross promotion. If the user
installs both apps, then the attacker can use the covert channel to move the location
information from Jog-Log into the voice recording app using a PMCC, and then use the
voice recording app to transmit the data to their host. In this case, the voice recording
app can declare the Internet permission, and still the user will not expect that there is any
way that their location information (in the Jog-Log app with no Internet permission) could
possibly be sent out over the Internet.
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If the developer chooses to implement two components in the same application, then
the malware can defeat current state-of-the-art defense techniques, but will be less stealthy
to users, because it must present all of the corresponding permissions together at install
time. Fortunately, it has been shown that the permission system is commonly abused by
users and developers [76], so this is not a significant challenge for the attacker.
If the attacker is a large enterprise that distributes smart mobile devices, they can include the malware via pre-installed applications. This approach is much simpler because
the attacker does not need to be concerned with market curation, or convincing users the
permissions required do not pose a threat. Pre-installed applications are also significantly
more difficult for users to remove, due to both technical and potential legal challenges.
However, few attackers have control of an enterprise or a similar level of influence over
which apps a user has installed.

5.4

Covert Channel Design

The foundation of our newly proposed malware, is our novel physical media covert channels. In this section we discuss our implementation of five such channels, to increase the
attack surface, making the defense more difficult, easing the task of creating seemingly
benign malware, and to show that the different channels have different strengths.
Each channel utilizes different permissions. We summarize what Android permissions
are used in Table 5.1. For the remainder of this chapter, we will use the row numbers of
this table to refer to specific permissions. It is important to note that permissions (4) and
(5) are actually members of Android's ``uses-feature'' tag, not the ``uses-permissions''
tag, which are optionally used by the developer.
All of our channels are stealthy to software, because until now, none of them are
considered to be able to transmit and receive information. They have varying stealth in
regards to the user, which we detail in each channel subsection.
Ultrasound We put extra effort into the development of our ultrasound covert channel
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Permission
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT
RECORD_AUDIO
android.hardware.sensor.accelerometer
android.hardware.sensor.gyroscope
VIBRATE
WAKE_LOCK
CAMERA
FLASHLIGHT
READ_PHONE_STATE
INTERNET

Hardware
Speaker
Microphone
Accelerometer
Gyroscope
Vibration Motor
Screen
Camera
Camera Flash
Phone

Description
Change volume
Direct access to speaker buffer (e.g., record phone call)
Use microphone
Use accelerometer
Use gyroscope
Use vibration motor
Prevent device from locking automatically
Take pictures
Use lamp
Learn if phone is locked or a call is active
Open network sockets

Table 5.1: Summary of various permissions used by our covert channels

to show that these physical media covert channels have potential for relatively high bitrates. This channel uses the speaker and microphone found on smart devices. The main
idea is we send very-high frequency, modulated sound waves (above 18kHz) in packets
from the device speaker to the microphone. Permissions (1) and (3) are used.
A high level view of the ultrasound covert channel can be seen in Fig. 5.2. Here
the attacker can control one malicious application (housing both the modulator and demodulator), or two applications, where the demodulator is separated out. The malicious
Data: 0101...

App 1

App 2

Demodulator (FFT)

Modulator
Hail

Data: 0101...

OFDM Data

Hail Listener

Android API
Information
Leak
Speaker

Microphone

Figure 5.2: High level module view of the ultrasound covert channel.

sender generates packets in the ``Modulator'' module and sends sound data over the device's speaker. The receiver uses the microphone to record this sound. The signal is first
parsed by the hail listener, which finds the starting point using the cross correlation between the received signal and a pre-established ``hailing'' signal. Then, using the Fourier
Transform (FFT) module, the malicious receiver can recover the data.
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We choose to use 18khz - 22kHz, because this spectrum is inaudible to humans
(stealthy), below the Nyquist frequency for most smart devices, and has relatively low
background noise. In order to remain inaudible, but still achieve a high bit-rate, we choose
to work in the frequency domain. We generate data segments 882 samples long, each of
which is the sum of many modulated sub-carrier frequencies.
22kHz
∑
f
si =
sin(2 ∗ π ∗ i ∗
+ θ) : ∀i ∈ [1 − 882]
Fs

(5.1)

f =18kHz

Each sub-carrier (of which there are 70, spaced 50Hz apart) encodes a binary phase
value and a binary amplitude (19% or 100%). We reserve four sub-carriers for calibration
(18k, 19k, 20k, 21k), which are used to reduce error when recovering bits. This affords
a maximum theoretical throughput of roughly 6.5kbps, which is high compared to traditional covert channels [27]. The receiver can use the FFT, to determine the amplitude and
phase of each sub-carrier frequency present in a given packet S = {s1 , s2 , ..., si }. This is
commonly referred to as orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM). When designing our system we used the following parameters. Packets of length i = 882 samples
(20ms), Γ = 50Hz sub-carrier width, and sample rate Fs = 44.1kHz. We use 3.5kHz of
spectrum from 18kHz to 21.5kHz.
Speaker and Accelerometer The speaker on most smart devices can cause the entire device to vibrate, if the tones are played with a loud enough volume. We use the
speaker as a sender, playing standard Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) tones, and
the accelerometer to measure the vibration of the phone, which will resonate with the
tones being played. We then perform binary amplitude shift keying to modulate the data.
DTMF codes are used because smart phones are designed to produce them well, and
they are less conspicuous in this context. Permissions (1) and (4) are used. Although
this channel is slower, and less stealthy than our ultrasound channel, we present it to
demonstrate that seemingly arbitrary sensors can be combined to form a channel.
Vibration and Accelerometer Our vibration channel uses the vibration motor (6),
normally used for silent notifications, as the sender, and the accelerometer (4) as the
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receiver. Again, binary amplitude shift keying is used for modulation. The stealth of this
channel can be increased, by transmitting immediately after benign vibration events. In
this way, the user may mistake the transmission for a long notification or may not notice
at all.
Flash and Camera In this channel the camera's flash (9) is used to send data and the
camera (8) is used to receive it. We simply turn the lamp on and off and run some simple
image processing on the captured image preview from the camera to transmit data. The
average brightness of the image should be much higher if the lamp is on, compared to
when it is off. This channel has several draw-backs. Firstly, the camera can only be used
by an application if a preview is shown in the foreground. Secondly, the camera light
is very obvious and suspicious to even non-savvy users. Thirdly, this channel relies on
some assumptions about physical orientation and environment. However, we show in our
evaluation that the channel works even when the device is placed camera-down on a flat
surface, which increases the practicality and stealthiness toward users.
User and Gyroscope The main idea of this covert channel is much different from the
others. Here, we tilt the phone, and measure this action using the gyroscope (5). Bits
are encoded in the angle of the device over time. To transmit the bits, we fool the user
into tilting the device in the correct sequence by implementing a simple ``endless running''
game. In the ``endless running'' genre, an avatar moves down a track collecting items
and avoiding obstacles. The user is tasked with tilting the device (or swiping) left and
right to move the character on and off several different tracks. Endless running games
typically feature randomly generated tracks, with the challenge being how long the user
can avoid the obstacles. We simply generate the track according to the bit stream to be
transmitted. This channel is highly stealthy in that the user is interacting directly with the
device, and will have no idea the channel is being used. In fact, the user is part of the
channel!
We make a novel generalization of this concept we call ``user-sensor'' covert channels,
which fool the user into taking specific actions (touching areas of the screen, pressing
90

hardware buttons, etc.), which act as data transmission symbols. User-sensor channels
present many unique challenges such as handling inevitable user errors, and clever game
design, which are out of the scope of this work.

5.5

Defense

The physical media covert channels (PMCC) we've outlined thus far exhibit the precarious nature of sensitive user data on modern smart mobile devices. Our goal in presenting them is to spur research in defending against these attacks, which pose an obvious
threat. To further our contribution in this work (above and beyond our previous publication
of PMCCs [73]) we present a defense framework, which protects against information leakage attacks done using PMCCs. A prudent defense must take into account many critical
design decisions such as maintaining high usability by avoiding nagging user prompts,
complex user-configured privacy policies, and coarse-grained or blanket rules. Applying
previous defense approaches, like TaintDroid[22] in a naive way will lead to poor usability
and therefore, poor user privacy. This is especially difficult for information leakage using PMCCs, because it is very difficult to differentiate, using static or dynamic analysis,
benign from malicious sensor use. Sensors are commonly used in a wide variety of benign applications with similar device combinations, and frequency of use. For example,
any teleconferencing application will make use of the speaker and microphone simultaneously, for a sustained period of time, in a completely benign way that is very similar to
an implementation of the speaker + microphone covert channel.
In our previous work, we laid out a ``first-step'' defense scheme that had extensibility
limitations, and was substantially different from the defense scheme we present in this
dissertation. Firstly, our original defense scheme used data structures that were different. The system recorded which Android component(s) (service, activity, etc), accessed
hardware devices (microphone, speaker, etc.). This required a special ``component'' data
structure, which stored the fully qualified package:component name, along with what de91

vice was being access, and taint-tag information. The previous defense maintained a
dynamic list of these components as different hardware devices were used. As far as limitations are concerned, our previous approach required a lot of effort to define new covert
channels between existing hardware devices, and to incorporate hardware besides those
implemented directly in our work (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope, camera, flash, vibration
motor, speaker, microphone, and custom canvas elements / the screen). Therefore, in
designing our new defense system, we summarize our three goals as follows:
• Coverage We demonstrate several covert channels in this work to demonstrate
that seemingly arbitrary devices can be used to form a covert channel. Our defense
should stop each of these channels, as well as provide extensibility to detect and
treat future channels.
• User Experience Our system should make it easy for the user to define the covert
channels that they are concerned with.
• Overhead The system should be low performance overhead and be minimally disruptive so that it does not take away from the user experience.
Our proposed defense system architecture, illustrated in Fig. 5.3, works in two stages
(Fig. 5.3 (b)). The detection stage aims to maintain an always up to date record, during
run time, of which potential covert channel devices are being used, and the data flowing
in/out of them. When sensor data is read (e.g., the microphone), if there is an active
corresponding sender device (e.g., the speaker), we propagate the taint-tag from the data
on the sender side (speaker), to the data on the receiver side (mic), thereby extending the
existing taint tracking solutions. Then, in the treatment stage, we provide some additional
protections according to a user configuration file such as alerting the user, or limiting the
use of the sensors in some way.
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(a) Defense System Architecture. Various system API classes are altered to
hook into the ``GuardService'' Android system service. The GuardService detects potential channels and applies the configured treatment.
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System

Figure 5.3: Architecture and Framework for our defense system. Applications that use sender devices are recorded. When there is a new data event for some hardware, the taint-tag is propagated
by our service, before the samples are delivered to the appropriate application component(s).

5.5.1 Taint-Tag Propagation
Fortunately, any application that is trying to transmit data secretly, using a PMCC, must
use an API provided by the operating system to access the hardware device(s). In order to detect the API use, we add a system service called the ``GuardService'' to the
operating system, and we modify the internal Android provided API of each device, to
hook into the GuardService. As illustrated in Fig. 5.3 (a), each physical device has a
corresponding .java file in the Android source code, which is modified to call the GuardService provided functions propTaintFromSnd(), clearDeviceTaint(), clearDeviceTaintDelay(), and getTaintForRec(). These methods allow the GuardService to monitor device
usage by any and all applications throughout the system, and to read/write the taint-tag of
data being sent to / received from any device. We also provide a mechanism for the user
to specify which covert channels they're concerned with monitoring. This information is
stored in the channel table, which is explained in greater detail in Section 5.5.2.
Sender Devices When any application sends data to a ``sender'' device (e.g., the
speaker or vibration motor), by calling the appropriate API function(s), there will be some
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data passed in that describes what the device should do. When this occurs, we use
propTaintFromSnd(), to read the taint-tag values from that input data, and store it in the
``taint-cache'' for the corresponding device. Because we extend the existing Taint-Droid
implementation, this taint information is a 32-bit bitmask and the taint cache is an array
of integers, one for each of the sender devices.
Receiver Devices When a receiver device (e.g., the microphone or accelerometer) is
accessed, getTaintForRec() is called, which causes the GuardService to look up the tainttag for the corresponding sender(s), in the taint-cache, and propagate the taint-tag from
the cache, onto the receiver data, before it is delivered to the application. The specifics of
the API, and the semantics of the data, are unique to each device and vary in complexity.
We describe in detail our implementation for the commonplace physical world sensors
and actuators on Android devices in Section 5.5.1.2. This approach allows us to monitor
the use of devices, and propogate taint-tag information from the sender side of the covert
channel to the reciever side.

5.5.1.1

API Implementation Details

In the following we outline the semantics of our four API function calls. Each of which
takes an int dev input parameter, which specifies a device. Our service provides integer
constants for the eight, most common devices (TYPE_VIB = 0, TYPE_ACCEL = 1, ...).

propTaintFromSnd(dev, taint) is called when a sender device begins transmitting, or
outputting. The dev specifies which device is transmitting, and taint specifies the tainttag to be cached. The taint-tag is stored in the taint-cache, indexed by the device being
used as the sender (e.g., the top or 0-index spot for the vibration motor). An example
taint-cache, with random values, in shown on the left side of Table 5.2.

getTaintForRec(dev) is called when a receiver device is providing data (usually done in
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batches), to an application. The function uses the channel table, which stores a mapping of which covert channels should be monitored. This table is user configurable (see
Section 5.5.2), and defaults to include five of the covert channels outlined previously in
Section 5.4. As an example, if an application begins reading the accelerometer data,
the GuardService will taint that value with the taint-tags stored in the taint-cache for the
vibration motor and the speaker, because those pairs are known to form PMCCs, and
are therefore monitored by default. In short, getTaintForRec() triggers a very small onecolumn search in the channel table, and looks up the taint-tag from the cache for the
corresponding sender devices. In this function, dev specifies the reciever device.

clearDeviceTaint(dev) is called to reset the taint-cache for dev to 0 when a sender device stops transmitting. For example, the vibration motor provides a cancel() function,
which immediately stops any vibration. When this function is called, we should also call
clearDeviceTaint() to reset the taint-tag value for the vibration motor to zero, as it is no
longer able to communicate any data. We describe how this function is used in more
detail for each device in section 5.5.1.2.

clearDeviceTaintDelay(dev, delay) is used to call clearDeviceTaint() after the specified
delay in milliseconds. Some devices are able to transmit data with little to no correlation
to the timing of API function calls, such as the speaker. The speaker API (AudioTrack)
allows the user to write data to the speaker buffer, and then begin playback by calling
play(). The play() function returns immediately, and the speaker produces the signal
previously written. The time it will take to produce the signal can be determined, based
on how much data was written to the buffer, and some parameters such as the sample
rate of the buffered data. After estimating the playback duration, clearDeviceTaintDelay()
can be used to clear the taint-tag after this time. This particular function implements a
thread, which waits for the given duration (delay) using the built in Thread.sleep() API.
After sleeping, the thread then calls clearDeviceTaint(). Because Thread.sleep() only
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guarantees that the calling thread will sleep for at least the given amount of time (lower
bound), the same is true of clearDeviceTaintDelay(). However, this error is tolerable,
because clearing the device taint-tag too late results in a false positive, which is overly
cautious instead of a false negative, which covert channels could game to transmit data
without taint-tag propagation.
When the malicious code uses a covert channel, the previous work breaks down. By
propagating the taint-tag information from the sender side data to the reciever data, using
the GuardService provided API, our system allows the taint information to traverse these
covert channels, as depicted in Fig. 5.3. And, by using taint-tracking analysis, we can
ignore benign instances when physical devices are being used, but there is no sensitive
information flow because the taint-tag of this data should be: 0.

5.5.1.2

Device Hook Implementation Details

We implement a prototype of our defense scheme on Android by downloading and modifying the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) source code. For taint tracking, we extend
the existing Taint-Droid system [22].
By default, none of the Android device API classes will notify our GuardService when
devices are in use, which is necessary in order to propagate taint information over the
covert channel. We modify the API for each device to hook into our ``GuardService''
accordingly using the API methods outlined in the previous section. While we strive to
make our GuardeService API simple and easy to use, a trivial approach cannot be taken
to implement the hooks. Because the devices vary greatly, the source code for these
classes is complex, and there are many potential pitfalls. In the following we analyze the
API of each of the sender devices and detail how we implement the hook.
Vibration Motor for the vibration motor, Android provides a function vibrate(long millies), and a second function vibrate(long[] pattern, int repeat), which both return immediately. In the former, long millies describes how long the vibration motor should vibrate,
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which begins immediately (ignoring negligible overhead) when the function is called by
the application. In the latter, the application provides an array of longs, that ``are the
durations for which to turn on or off the vibrator in milliseconds'' [39] and an int repeat,
which specifies the index at which to repeat the pattern from (-1 to disable repeating).
When vibrate(long millies) is called, we read the taint-tag data from millies and store it
in the taint-cache by calling propTaintFromSnd(). At the same time, we call clearDeviceTaintDelay() to set a timer, which expires after millies milliseconds and then clears the
taint-tag value. This way, when the vibration motor has stopped vibrating, we no longer
propogate any taint-tag values. Similarly, when vibrate(long[] millies, int repeat) is called,
we concatenate the taint-tag values from long[] millies and int repeat and pass the resulting value into propTaintFromSnd() to be stored in the taint-cache. When cancel() is
called, the taint-cache is cleared, so we do not have to set any timer in this case. Clearly,
even the simple vibration motor has a relatively complex API.
Flash For the camera and flash covert channel, we describe how to transmit data
using the flash, but there are actually several parameters that can be used to encode data
such as the image resolution, which are provided in a Camera.Parameters class. When
the camera is opened, the propTaintFromSnd() method is called, and we propagate the
taint-tag of the entire class instance to the taint-cache. getTaintForRec() is called when a
picture is taken, or preview frames are delivered, and clearDeviceTaint() is called when
the camera is closed.
Speaker For covert channels using the speaker, the developer can implement the
speaker API in one of two modes; a streaming mode and a static mode. In the static
mode, described previously, the developer first instantiates an AudioTrack class instance,
and writes any sound data using the .write() method, which writes an array to an internal
buffer. Later, the developer calls a .play() method, which instructs the hardware to actually
play the signal previously written. Alternatively, the developer can choose to implement
streaming mode, in which the developer calls the .play() method first, and then, after some
time, the .write() method, which will instantly generate the sound.
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Our system places propTaintFromSnd() and clearDeviceTaintDelay() appropriately
depending on the mode; i.e. with .play() in static mode and with .write() in streaming
mode. We can estimate the duration that the speaker will be making noise based on the
sample rate and the size of the array(s) passed to .write(). This duration can then be
passed to clearDeviceTaintDelay(). This microphone implementation is straightforward
and relatively similar to the speaker implementation, therefore, we have left it out of this
work for brevity.
User and Game For this channel, the sender appears to be the user, but actually,
the user responds to the information presented on the screen by the malicious game.
Because the attacker has implemented a game for this channel, it is safe to assume that
they will implement a canvas element to draw the game graphics. The Android canvas
element exposes an onDraw method to the developer, which is called rapidly to update
the current frame on the screen. We can propagate the taint-tags from the variables and
data used in onDraw that are used in helper functions such as drawRect() and drawArc().
As mentioned previously, to implement our defense scheme, we leverage an existing
run-time based, taint-analysis system called TaintDroid [22]. The key difference between
TaintDroid, and our work, is the inclusion of the physical media covert channels in the taintpropagation logic. While TaintDroid focuses primarily on internal or ``virtual'' information
flow paths such as variable assignment, function calls, and inter-component communication, we focus on including external or ``physical media'' information flows. Namely,
physical media covert channels.

5.5.1.3

Extending GuardService

In our implementation, we include all of the most common physical world devices commonly found on smart mobile devices (i.e. speakers, microphones, vibration motors, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and cameras). The variability in the API semantics from device
to device poses a challenge for our defense scheme. While we fully support all common-
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place devices, and allow the user to easily specify which channels should be monitored,
it is difficult to add support for new or different devices when they are added to handsets,
and it becomes apparent that they may be used as part of a covert channel in the future;
such as temperature sensors or notification LEDs.
To address this limitation, we strive to design our defense scheme in such a way that
it is easy to extend to add support for new devices like these. Our GuardService provides
a simple API for hooking in new hardware devices that is focused on the simple design
concept of input, and output. Although manufacturers, privacy advocates, or even technically savvy end-users will have to modify the Android system source code to hook into our
GuardService, our simple API makes it easier. Therefore, when a device manufacturer
produces a hand-set with a new hardware device (such as a temperature sensor), it is
necessary to make only a few changes. A new constant (e.g., TYPE_TEMP = 5) should
be defined, and the GuardService API methods should be called in the API code that
controls when and how the device is accessed. Because it is already necessary to write
the API code (for the device to be used at all), only a few lines need to be added to hook
into the GuardService framework.
Specifically, for devices that output in some way, there should be an API call that allows applications to send (output) data to them. This API call should include a call to
GuardService.propTaintFromSnd() passing in the taint-tag from the output data. GuardService.clearDeviceTaint() should be called when the device has finished outputting. Similarly, for devices that accept data (sensors), the API should call GuardService.getTaintForRec()
to retrieve the taint-tag information and apply it to the output data. The GuardService
maintains the taint-tag data from other devices, and coordinates user configurations about
which channels should be monitored.
Furthermore, we design our defense so that GuardService hooks are inserted at the
Android API layer (as opposed to a kernel module or the driver level). This means that
all instances of a particular type of device (e.g. microphones from different manufacturers) will all be supported when a single, corresponding API file (e.g., AudoTrack.java) is
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modified just one time.

5.5.2 User Configuration
We provide an end-user facing graphical user interface, which allows the user to specify
which PMCCs should be monitored. PMCCs can be used under certain circumstances
only. Namely, the sender application must (1) have access to a source of sensitive information, and (2) have permission to use the hardware to transmit the information in a
PMCC. The attacker must also (3) have control of some secondary component / application to receive the information, and (4) the receiving component must have permission to
use the reciever hardware device. Furthermore, the system must make use of the PMCC
without the user noticing. Therefore, users may feel confident that certain covert channels cannot be utilized, because the user would notice. They may act cautiously with the
applications they install, or they may believe that it is simply impossible for some device
pairs to communicate (e.g., the speaker and camera). Alternatively, new PMCCs may
be discovered in the future, which the user may wish to monitor. For these reasons, we
provide the user the ability to specify which covert channels they wish to monitor.
We arrange all known sender and receiver devices as the rows and columns of a table
respectively. This table is known as the Channel Table, mentioned previously and shown
in Fig. 5.3. An example channel table, with default values, is shown on the right side of
Table 5.2. The table cell at the coordinates indicated by the device constants (e.g. position (2, 3) for the Falsh + Camera covert channel), stores a boolean value, which indicates
to the system that the user is concerned with this covert channel, and that the taint-tag
from the sender (Flash) data should be propagated to the reciever (Camera) data. The
GuardService also exposes three API function calls to support GUI client applications as
shown in Fig 5.3. The first, setPair(int snd, int rec), allows the user to set the corresponding spot in the channel table as True. The second, clearPair(int snd, int rec), sets the
corresponding spot False. The third, queryTable() allows the client application to view
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the current status of the channel table.
In our implementation we provide a simple client Android application, which exposes
a user facing GUI. This application allows the user to view the current state of the table,
and it provides a simple interface, which is connected to setPair() and clearPair(). A
screenshot of our GUI can be see in Fig. 5.4. Default values for the table are provided
according to the channels we've described here (see Table 5.2). The application is able to
call setPair() and clearPair(), which are part of GuardService, running in another process,
because the GuardService exposes these methods for any client to call via the Android
interface definition language (AIDL). The GuardService also exposes queryTable(), which
allows applications to learn the contents of the table (which may have been changed by
other client applications or processes). In our implementation, this method is polled once
every two seconds as long as the application is in the foreground.

Figure 5.4: Screenshot of our user facing PMCC configuration application. The user can turn
monitoring on and off for specific channels using the controls on the top, and view the current
monitor status in the table below.
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Taint-Cache
0x0
0x100
0x0
0x800

Vibration Motor
Speaker
Flash
Screen

Channel Table
Accelerometer Gyroscope
True
False
True
False
False
False
False
True

Microphone
False
True
False
False

Camera
False
False
True
False

Table 5.2: GuardService Channel Table, which is used to indicate which covert channels the user
is concerned with. The values shown above are the default, which correspond to the channels
outlined in our work. The taint-cache (shown on the left) stores the current taint-tag value from
the data sent into the API call(s) for the corresponding Hardware.

5.5.3 Advanced Treatment Techniques
To improve our defense system, we also present several potential treatment methods
in the second stage to further enhance the security of the framework. As illustrated in
Fig. 5.3 (b), when a covert channel is detected, our system intervenes and reads a user
controlled configuration file to determine what additional action to take, if any. Providing
an array of different treatments options allows our framework to be very flexible and allows
us to include the best ideas from recent literature, as well as leave the system open for
improvement in the future, when new covert channels are discovered. Below we describe
each of these options in greater detail.
Alert The User The weakest choice of treatment is for the system to alert the user of a
possible information leak. This is the default action.
Choose One One device is turned off (the samples are dropped) for the duration the other
device is in use. Which device is allowed and which is prohibited is a tunable parameter.
Dynamically Switch Allow only one device to operate transiently based on a simple
threshold. For example, a video conferencing application may access the speaker and
microphone concurrently. However, in typical conversation it is uncommon that both parties are actually speaking at the same time. Based on which signal is stronger (i.e. RMS
for audio signals), we allow only one to flow, as illustrated in Fig. 5.5. By switching dynamically between the two sensors, we guarantee the covert channel cannot be utilized,
because there is never a time when both sensors are active, but benign applications are
still usable.
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t

Time
Figure 5.5: ``Dynamically Switch'' treatment method. The speaker and the microphone cannot
be accessed at the same time. The active device is chosen in each time window by calculating
which root mean squared (RMS) is larger. The other device is silenced.

Rate Limit For the flash and camera channel, the two devices must be used at the same
time in order to take pictures in low light conditions. Instead of prohibiting access to one
device, one possible solution is to limit the rate at which that device can be used.
Altering the Signal For all of these channels, we can increase the error rate the attacker
achieves by changing the signal. For example, filtering out ultrasonic audio, removing
samples to create random pauses, or inserting noise in the signal. However, we must be
careful not to effect benign behavior. Clever approaches may be possible, but unfortunately, must be tailored specifically to the encoding scheme of the attacker, as well as the
signal processing of the benign application(s).
Reduce Permissions There are several ways we can defeat the channel by altering the
permissions of the application components involved. For example, each component can
be re-assigned the intersection of the permissions of both temporarily, which follows the
principle of least privilege.

5.5.4 Limitations -- Implicit Flow Taint Tracking
As we mentioned previously, we leverage the existing Taint-Droid work for dynamic taint
tracking analysis [22]. This system only tracks explicit flows, meaning direct assignments
from one variable to another as shown in Fig. 5.6. However, in this case, it is very likely the
attacker will use implicit flows to encode the sensitive information, as shown in Fig. 5.7.
To overcome this challenge, we propose a method inspired by previous work [64]. We
identify these implicit flows using static analysis and include implicit flow taint propagation
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s = api.getSensitiveInfo();
a = s;
a = s.getCharAt(3);
networkAPI.transmit(a);
Figure 5.6: Examples of explicit information flow.

signalSampleList = new List();
s = api.getSensitiveInfo();
for bit in s.toBinary(){
if(bit == 0){
signalSampleList.addSilence(500);
}
else{
signalSampleList.addNoise(500);
}
}
vibrationAPI.vibrate(signalSampleList);
Figure 5.7: Example of implicit information flow.

rules following a simple heuristic: If a branch depends on a tainted value, then we should
propagate the taint-tag to the variables assigned inside the branch. Our modifications
are done in three stages. First, at install time, the application is decompiled from the dex
files to Java code. Then, we use static analysis to automatically find implicit flow blocks.
We re-write the application code to propagate taint information into the variables in these
blocks. Then, in the final stage, we recompile the application, re-generate the .apk file,
and install it on the user’s device. To reduce false positives, we only apply our implicit
flow propagation if the output variable data depends on the entirety of the sensitive input
data.
This approach is not perfect, malware has a long history of resisting such techniques.
We leave more robust automatic application re-writing, implicit flow taint-tag propagation,
and code block analysis to future work.
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5.6

Evaluation

In our system we implement five covert channels, which utilize physical mediums (e.g.,
sound, vibration). We implement all five covert channels as single user-space applications. The two application scenario, with one sender and one receiver will not have any
effect on transmission speed, errors, or stealth, so we did not implement it. The ultrasound channel was evaluated on an LG-C800 smartphone. The speaker / accelerometer,
vibration / accelerometer, and light / camera channels were tested on a Samsung Nexus
S and the game / gyroscope channel was tested on a Google Nexus 4. The dynamic
switching defense evaluation was done on the Nexus S and LG-C800. The taint tracking
experiments were done with a Galaxy Nexus.

5.6.1 Covert Channels
To evaluate the ultrasound covert channel, we implemented an android application that
generates ultra-sound packets, as described previously. We transmitted 1000 bits in
twelve iterations and plotted the percentage of bits recovered incorrectly in Fig. 5.8. We
30
Total
Amplitude
Phase

25

Errors (%)

20
15
10
5
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Run

8

9

10

11

12

Figure 5.8: Ultrasound Bit Error Rate. Phase and Amplitude correspond to bit errors from demodulating these sub-carrier attributes respectively.

can see that the total error percentage and phase error percentage have high variance
(6.98, and 6.01 respectively). Trial number six shows that, occasionally, the channel can
achieve very low error rates. Amplitude error has lower variance (0.57) and shows a lower
mean (3.3%). Using both phase and amplitude, we can achieve a bit rate of 6.5kbps with
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relatively high mean error (14%), and by utilizing amplitude only, we can achieve a lower
rate of 3.25kbps that is more consistent.
We performed a short audibility user study to show that our ultrasound scheme is
stealthy. A random string of 1000 bits was encoded and transmitted three times in the
presence of ten individuals between the ages of twenty and thirty. The experiments were
held in two different meetings, with a volume of

6
16 .

Participants were not notified be-

forehand of the experiment and were questioned shortly afterwards about having heard
anything. Unanimously, nobody was able to hear our system being used. Even after being told, and actively listening, untrained users have great difficulty hearing the ultrasound
signals emitted.
Speaker & Accelerometer We implemented the speaker and accelerometer covert
channel described previously and we used it to transmit 1024 random bits, ten times, at a
rate of 2bps to measure the bit error rate. Because we don't have robust synchronization,
our demodulator sometimes inserts extra (incorrect) bits or drops bits. We count the
total number of bits in error as the sum of the number of inserted, dropped, or incorrectly
decoded (flipped) bits. Each type is only counted as one error, even though missing a bit
will propagate errors through the rest of the bit stream. For this channel, the recovery is
very good; we had only four bit errors (0.039%). Six of the runs transmitted with no errors
at all.
Vibration Motor & Accelerometer To evaluate this channel we transmitted 1024
random bits ten times and recorded the bit errors, by type, in Fig. 5.9. This channel has a
low error rate and achieves 2bps throughput. Similar to the Speaker and Accelerometer
channel, we can see that there are only a few bits which were incorrectly decoded, the
rest of the errors are due to improper synchronization.
Camera & Flash We transmitted 1024 bits using the channel ten times and measured
the bit error rate and transmission time. The experiments were done in a dark room
(similar to when the user may be sleeping), which can be seen in Fig 5.10. Over all ten
trials, there were no bit recovery errors and the transmission time was very consistent
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Figure 5.9: Vibration bit errors by type. Inserted: extra bit was decoded. Dropped: bit is missing.
Incorrect: bit was decoded incorrectly (flipped).

at 664 seconds (±2). The bit rate we achieve is 1.5bps. The limiting factor here is the
camera preview, which takes about one second and must be started and stopped each
time to change the flash's state. We also performed a simple test to confirm that the

(a) Camera Down, Flash

(b) Camera Down, No Flash

Figure 5.10: Camera images captured with and without flash. Images gathered when the phone
was camera down, on a desk.

camera can be in different orientations and environments. We placed the phone flat on
the ground, in a poorly lit area under a desk, held upright in a dark room at night, and flat,
camera down on a desk. It's important to note that even when the device is placed flat,
face down on a smooth service, it's still possible to determine if the image taken had the
flash on or off, as can be seen in Fig. 5.10. This is because the camera has a small piece
of acrylic which covers both the flash and the camera lens. This piece of acrylic allows
light to flight laterally from the flash lamp directly into the camera lens. We transmitted
eight bits using this channel; each time and we were able to recover all eight bits with no
errors in every scenario. We can attribute this success to the physical design of camera
hardware on the phone (Samsung Nexus S). Because some light is able to travel from the
flash to the camera lens, even when the camera is facing down on a table the stealthyness
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of the channel is greatly improved, as the user will not notice the flash when blocked by
the desk.
User / Gyroscope We implemented a very primitive game prototype in which the user
is instructed by a foreground application to rotate the phone in one of the three axes (6
different symbols). A background service measures the gyroscope at the same time to
decode the bits. The user is tasked with finishing each rotation task in as short a time as
possible. We played this ``game'' ten times and transmitted twenty symbols each time.
On average, the user is able to rotate the phone in 1.02 seconds, making for a bit rate of
roughly 2.5bps. There were no bit errors whatsoever.
Comparison In Table 5.3 we compare the average case error rate and speed of each
covert channel. In order to remove transmission errors entirely, we can use hamming
codes to correct single packet errors and retransmit packets containing more than one
error. We estimate the effective speed after hamming codes are applied in the ``Eff.
Speed'' column.
Channel
Speaker/Mic
Spkr/Mic (Amp Only)
Speaker/Accelerometer
Vibration/Accelerometer
Light/Camera
User Game/Gyroscope

Error
14.4%
3.3%
0.04%
0.28%
0%
0%

Speed (w/errors)
6.5kbps
3.25kbps
2bps
2bps
1.5bps
2.5bps

Eff. Speed
3.71kbps
2.73kbps
1.99bps
1.94bps
1.5bps
2.5bps

Table 5.3: Comparing best case speed and average error rate of various covert channels before
error correction coding (Speed) and after (Eff. Speed).

5.6.2 Defense
For our defense system, effectiveness and usability are top concerns. Unfortunately,
performing a robust effectiveness evaluation is difficult, because there is no known or
cataloged malware in the wild that, to the best of our knowledge, takes advantage of
PMCC as described in this work. Therefore, we can only test the system on our own
contrived examples, in all of these cases, the system was able to identify active covert
channels, and propagate the taint-tag information. Our system currently breaks down in
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Channel
Ultrasound
Speaker/Accel.
Vibration/Accel.
Light/Camera

Delivery Time
(system off)
37.5ms
5ms
4.9ms
8.36ms

Delivery Time
(system on)
38.5ms
7.5ms
6.1ms
10.1ms

Table 5.4: Overhead measurements for delivering samples from various hardware devices with
and without our system running.

situations involving implicit flows. Currently, we do not have a robust solution for tainttracking through implicit flows, but in the future, we plan to implement a better solution, at
which time an effectiveness evaluation will be more interesting.
To measure the usability, we record the time it takes for the system to deliver new
samples to the various devices (overhead), the effort of implementing the GuardService
hooks (lines of code), the time added by our application re-writing to support implicit flows,
and the usability of benign applications under our dynamic switching treatment technique.

5.6.2.1

Taint Propagation Overhead

We implemented our defense by leveraging the existing TaintDroid implementation [22].
Therefore, the memory overhead is identical to their work. The stack is basically doubled
in size, due to the extra space needed to store the taint values (except for arrays which
share one taint-tag for the entire structure). However, when new samples are delivered,
our system introduces some time overhead, because we must lookup and propagate
(bitwise OR) the taint value from the sender data to the receiver data. We implemented the
ultrasound, speaker + accelerometer, vibration + accelerometer, and the light + camera
channels. We measured the average time for the dispatchSensorEvent() method to finish
delivering the data with and without our system running over ten runs. The results are
presented in Table 5.4.
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5.6.2.2

Implementation Effort

When designing our GuardService we aim to make it easy for developers to implement
our hooks in the operating system device API files. To evaluate the effort required, we
analyze our own implementation of the hooks in five of the most common device API files
(i.e., the speaker, microphine, vibration motor, accelerometer & gyroscope, and the camera & flash). For each file, we measure the total lines of code before our changes, and
the number of lines added to implement the hooks (the amount of lines deleted was negligable). We present the results in Fig. 5.11. The percentages given are the percentage of
unchaged code for each file. In general we see that the hooks represent a relatively small
change to each file. In SystemSensorManager.java our code contributes almost 25% of
the total code. It's important to remember that this is actually the hooks for two devices
(the accelerometer and the gyroscope), and in raw values, we only added 103 lines of
code.
4000
3500

Original LOC
GuardService Hooks

3000
2500
2000

97.6%

1500
1000
500

91.3%
89.6%

91.8%

75.4%

0
AudioTrack.java

AudioRecord.java

VibratorService.java

SystemSensorManager.java

Camera.jav

Figure 5.11: LOC required to implement GuardService hooks. Percentages given are the percentage of unmodified code.

5.6.2.3

Implicit Flow Propagation

To measure the overhead introduced by our implicit flow taint propagation solution, we
manually re-wrote a representative if statement in an Android app using the d2j decompiler, and the Google provided application packaging tools. The body of the if statement
contains a for loop, similar to Fig. 5.7, a primitive variable assignment, an array element
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assignment, a function call, and a custom object construction. To ensure the taint values
are propagated within the implicit flow code bodies, we multiply the to-be-tainted variables
by a tainted variable with the value one. By doing this, we guarantee that the variable will
receive the taint-tag (through the direct assignment taint-droid rule), but also that the variable data will not by modified (multiplying by one has no effect). In 25 trial runs of this if
statement, our re-written version, which propagates taint-tags into all of this data, introduced only 1ms of overhead on average.

5.6.2.4

Dynamic Switching

To evaluate the effectiveness of this defense treatment, we implemented a very simple
speaker / microphone covert channel. The speaker makes some audible sound and the
microphone records this sound. Loud and quiet periods correspond to ``1'' and ``0'' bits
respectively, with symbols 0.5s wide. We sent the bit sequence 01010011 twice; once
using our defense and once without. We plotted the data the microphone measured in
Fig 5.12. We can see that when the defense is running (plotted in red), the symbols
Undefended
Defended
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2000
1000
0
−1000
−2000
0.4
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1.8
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Figure 5.12: Samples gathered from the microphone while transmitting from the speaker. The
data with the defense scheme running is plotted in red.

are almost completely erased. The small tail at the end of each symbol is the result of
the slow propagation time of sound and hardware introduced latency. We consider this
problem to be negligible, because the tails are very brief, and conceal the transmission
of consecutive ``1s''.
We also used a VoIP app (Skype), to measure usability. We instrumented our system
on one phone and made a phone call to a second phone. Both users were able to hold a
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brief ten second conversation without any words being dropped or misunderstood.

5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter we present an attack on mobile smart devices that leverages physical
media covert channels to enable privilege escalation and ultimately leak sensitive user
information. We also present a novel defense technique that balances usability with the
security and privacy concerns raised by this attack.
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Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation contributes to the security and privacy of mobile devices from three different aspects. Firstly, in Chapter3 we present a solution at the application layer, which
allows users to determine privately if they are near one another. This is tremendously
useful because it can be used as a building block to create private variations of popular social networks, location based services, and applications available today. By using
our system, users no longer have to worry about their private location information being
leaked to third party advertisers, government organizations, or miscellaneous attackers
and stalkers. Our system is the first to provide private location proximity detection with a
configurable threshold for what is considered ``nearby.''
Secondly, at the physical layer, we provide a novel mechanism for proximity networking with our ultrasound modem. Now that users are carrying their devices everywhere, a
natural and intuitive expectation is to share small pieces of information with one another
when together. We support this using ultrasound on commodity mobile devices, which
has several advantages. It is readily deployable on nearly all commercial smart devices,
because it does not require any special hardware. It is also directional, due to the nature
of ultrasound. This means that users can simply aim their transmissions at the intended
receiver without worrying about eavesdroppers in nearby rooms.
Thirdly, we propose and implement a defense mechanism, at the operating system
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layer, to defend against our novel physical media covert channels. Our defense mechanism extends existing state-of-the-art research to protect users from information leakage.
Our system is able to stop all of the proposed covert channels we introduced, and can
even be easily extended and configured to include other covert channels and devices.

6.1

Lessons Learned

In doing this research, I have learned several broad and high level aspects about the complex intersection of ubiquitous computing, mobile devices, security, privacy, and the state
of the industry. The first is that the research world in all of these subfields is dominated
by the Android operating system, as opposed to iOS, because it is open source. Therefore, researchers can inspect it, critique it, and make improvements on it. The number of
top conference papers that would not be possible without a wide-spread, popular, open
source mobile operating system is staggering.
Secondly, research in security and privacy on mobile devices is interesting because
to achieve satisfactory results it is important to take into account the needs and wants
of several different parties. Each of these parties is complex and cannot be easily explained. End users strongly prefer functionality, convenience and price over nearly every other feature including privacy and especially over security. Although something like
security or privacy are major selling points, users are generally poorly educated and a)
do not properly understand these features and b) usually choose price and functionality over, for example, secure but costly or private but less functional. Corporations and
large enterprises need to recuperate from financial losses spent developing services and
applications and therefore will usually try to monetize via advertisements. Developers
are generally lazy, and will almost always choose the path of least resistance. Combining all of these self-interested actors into one ecosystem causes a variety of problems.
Fortunately, researchers are able to take a less bias approach and can find success in
providing solutions that strike a compromise between them. It is my hope that this disser114

tation provides this in at least a small way.

6.2

Future Work

Covert Channel Improvements In Chapter 5, I discuss in detail the idea of physical
media covert channels and a substantial defense mechanism is proposed that aims to
be easy to use and even easy to extend to support other devices. As a possible avenue
for future work, I would like to explore the idea of providing an entirely different API for
sensors on a user's device.
Currently, unfettered, raw sensor data can be accessed with little or no permissions
by application developers. We propose an API, which would instead offer higher level
features and metrics derived directly from the raw sensor data. By providing higher level
``meta'' data, we support a variety of application use cases (in fact we make the job of
implementing many applications easier), while at the the same time making it significantly
more difficult to use these devices in a physical media covert channel. For example,
a developer may wish to build a pedometer application, which counts steps based on
accelerometer data. In our system, the developer calls our API functions, which return
various metrics, rather than the raw sensor data, such as a sliding window RMS value,
frequency analysis, and so on, from the accelerometer. The developer can then configure
the size and overlap of the window, in order to maximize the accuracy of their pedometer.
Because the developer is limited to only RMS output and a handful of other metrics
on the data, developing a malicious covert channel, which uses the accelerometer (as
described in Chapter 5) is much more difficult and can transmit fewer bits per second.
Secondly, this API alleviates some work for the developer, who no longer must implement
the window, the RMS calculation, fast Fourier transform, or the buffering of raw sample
hardware interrupts. Thirdly, this API leads naturally to an alternate permission system.
Instead of granting all or nothing access to the raw sensor stream, we grant access only
to each metric on the data, which we can present to the user as less dangerous.
115

Internet of Things Mobile computing is currently thriving, but it is not the future of
my research. While it is likely that mobile phones will continue to remain dominant in the
computing lives of nearly everybody in the developed world, it is likely that new research
challenges will diminish. Looking forward, the Internet of Things (IoT) is starting to grow in
popularity at the intersection of mobile computing, ubiquitous computing, social networking, sensing, and data science. The IoT is defined as a proposed development of the
Internet, in which everyday objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and
receive data. Example applications include small simple conveniences such as turning
lights on in your home when you park your car in the garage, to elaborate and sophisticated sensing and actuation systems such as buildings with humidity, temperature, and
vibration sensors used to aid in building maintenance and city planning.
Unfortunately, as innovation and exploration take the lead, security and privacy typically fall by the wayside. While the future of the Internet of Things is promising, the
current reality is that users demand that these devices are compatible with each other,
and easy to use, which means that extra security measures such as encryption, proper
network configuration, and passwords are usually ignored. The possible future for the IoT
is exciting and vast, which poses a promising picture for future research in this field [105].
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